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CHARACTER IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE:
PSYCHO-BAYESIAN [!? ] ANALYSIS AND
A PROPOSED OVERHAUL
Richard Friedman*
At first I thought it was very unlikely that, if Defoe committed
robbery, he would be willing to lie about it. But now that I know
he committed forgery a year before, that possibility seems sub-
stantially more likely.
INTRODUCTION
This fictitious quotation appears utterly lacking in logic or
common sense. And yet, because of the perceived chance that juries
will follow such trains of inference, the area of character impeach-
ment has become one of the most difficult and controversial in the
law of evidence. This Article argues for a sweeping reform of the
law in this area.
The current law, reviewed in Part I, varies widely from one
jurisdiction to another, but the Federal Rules of Evidence are repre-
sentative. Rule 608(a)l allows an impeaching party to offer opinion
or reputation evidence of a witness's poor character for truthful-
ness, and rule 608(b) allows the impeacher, subject to the discretion
of the trial judge, to ask the witness about specific instances of her2
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. My thanks to Charlie
Bieneman, Matt Harris, and Vivian James for much valuable assistance in the prepara-
tion of this Article; to David Buss, Phoebe Ellsworth, Sam Gross, Doug Kahn, Jerry
Israel, Larry Kramer, Mike Malinowski, Al Moore, Dick Nisbett, Patrick O'Malley,
and Ted Sorensen for helpful comments and suggestions; and to Joanna Friedman for
constant love and encouragement, as well as professional and stylistic insights despite
her distaste for what this Article shows about "the way [my] mind works."
1. All references to evidentiary rules in this Article are to the Federal Rules of
Evidence unless otherwise noted.
2. For simplicity, this Article generally uses feminine pronouns to refer to wit-
nesses other than criminal defendants, as to which it generally uses masculine pronouns.
This is not a satisfying solution; the language needs a full set of gender neutral pro-
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prior conduct that suggest she has a poor character for truthfulness.
Rule 608 draws no distinction between a criminal defendant and
any other witness. In contrast to the open-ended nature of rule 608,
rule 609 establishes categorical rules governing when the impeacher
may prove that the witness has previously been convicted of a
crime. The balancing test governing admissibility of certain crimes
is weighted differently depending on whether or not the witness is
the accused in a criminal case; for the most part, however, the most
critical factor under rule 609 is not the identity of the witness, but
rather the nature of the prior crime.3
The revision proposed here has two parts. First, and most im-
portantly, character impeachment of a criminal defendant who
takes the witness stand ought to be abolished in all of its forms-
opinion and reputation, specific bad acts, and prior convictions.
This Article does not suggest limiting other forms of impeachment,
such as by proof of bias or of prior inconsistent statements. Nor
does it deny that in some circumstances prior bad acts of a defend-
ant should be admitted for substantive purposes, such as to show
that the defendant had the motive or ability to commit the crime
charged.4 The contention of this Article is simply that an accused
ought not be subjected to impeachment offered to show that he has
a poor general character for truthfulness.
This contention is not based on any assertion that prior crimes
reveal little about a person's general truthtelling inclination.
Rather, Part III of this Article attempts to show by careful analysis
that, in the particular context of an accused who testifies in his own
behalf, evidence about prior bad acts, or about his truthtelling char-
acter in general, is almost certain to yield no significant new infor-
mation about his truthtelling inclination in the specific, case.
Almost certainly, whatever probative value the evidence does have
will be dwarfed by the prejudicial impact that evidence will have if
the defendant takes the stand, and by the inhibiting effect it has in
making him reluctant to do so.
The elimination of all character impeachment evidence of
criminal defendants would be a change of enormous importance.
As a quick glance through the pages of the United States Code An-
nouns. For one possibility, see Letter from Milton R. Stem to Editor (May 13, 1985).
N.Y. Times, May 31, 1985, § A, at 26, col. 4 (suggesting "Jhe" as a gender neutral
form).
3. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Thus, the Article contends only that the ac-
cused's character as a witness ought not be opened to scrutiny.
[Vol. 38:637
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notated covering rule 609 suggests, prosecutors offer this type of
evidence very frequently, and both sides recognize its potency and
often litigate its admissibility with great vigor. Moreover, because
the rule often inhibits defendants from testifying, the mere anticipa-
tion of character impeachment evidence can have great effect. If
prosecutors could not present such evidence, more criminal defend-
ants would take the stand, and those who did would not be subject
to this potentially devastating form of impeachment. The pro-
defendant effects of eliminating the rule might, however, justify an-
other change, one favoring the prosecution. The inhibiting effect of
anticipated character impeachment evidence is probably the princi-
pal factor supporting the rule of Griffin v. California, 5 constitution-
ally barring a prosecutor from commenting on an accused's failure
to testify; thus, as Part III discusses, eliminating character impeach-
ment may well call for a reevaluation of Griffin.
The considerations affecting the value and danger of character
impeachment evidence are altogether different when the witness is
someone other than an accused. Part IV argues that in some cir-
cumstances a prior crime may have sufficient bearing on the
truthtelling inclination of a witness, other than an accused, to war-
rant admissibility. This holds true even if the prior crime did not in
itself involve dishonesty and was not particularly serious, and even
if it occurred rather remotely in the past. The nature of the prior
crime may be significant in determining the value of the evidence
and its potential prejudicial effect, but often other factors, such as
the relationship of the witness to the case, will be more important in
determining admissibility.
Under the second part of the proposed revision, the flexible
standard of rule 608 for impeachment by bad acts should apply as
well to impeachment by prior convictions with respect to witnesses
other than a criminal defendant. That is, the categorical rules gov-
erning the admissibility of such impeachment should be removed,
and the matter should be left to the properly guided discretion of
the trial judge.
Looked at another way, rule 609 should be repealed, and rule
608 should be narrowed in one respect and broadened in another;
the accused-witness should no longer be subject to impeachment
under rule 608, but as to other witnesses the court's discretion
under that rule should reach to prior convictions as well as to bad
acts.
5. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
1991]
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Other commentators have suggested that impeachment of
criminal defendants by proof of their prior convictions should be
limited or even eliminated.6 Virtually none, however, have gone so
far as this Article in advocating the end of all character impeach-
ment of a criminal defendant, 7 by opinion or reputation evidence
and by cross-examination concerning prior bad acts, as well as by
proof of prior convictions." Further, no previous discussions appear
to have offered anything close to the two-direction movement pro-
posed here--eliminating character impeachment evidence of crimi-
nal defendants, but making the admissibility standards with respect
to other witnesses more flexible.
The methodology of this Article, as well as the proposed revi-
sion, is unique in the extensive literature on character impeachment.
Those who have followed the recent debate about theories of infer-
ence in the law of evidence will note a distinct Bayesian cast to the
arguments made here.9 Readers with a distaste for symbols, equa-
tions, and diagrams need not stop here; nothing of the sort appears
in the body of this Article. For those who are interested, the Ap-
6. See, e.g., Beaver & Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Con-
viction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 587 (1985) (concluding "that Federal Rule
609 and the similar rule [sic] in effect in forty-seven states should be revised to exclude
all evidence of criminal defendants' prior convictions for virtually any purpose of-
fered."); Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 609 of the Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence for US. District Courts, 6 CRiM. L. BULL. 330, 336, 348 (1970)
(convictions for crimes of dishonesty are the only ones that should be admissible to
impeach an accused); Nichol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A
Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 421 (1980) (rule 609 de-
prives the accused of the right to a fair trial); Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of
Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 137-39, 145
(1989) (Because extrinsic crime evidence tends to introduce "the ethos of a presumption
of guilt rather than innocence," it should be admissible only upon findings "that the
extrinsic crime actually took place and that the defendant committed it more likely than
not" and that the evidence has a greater probative value than prejudice and would not
be misused by the jury.); Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 169 (1984) (Prosecution
should have to inform the defense whenever, under Rules 404(b) or 608(b), it intends to
introduce evidence of unindicted criminal acts.).
7. At least one commentator advocates going much further, however, by eliminat-
ing all character impeachment evidence in criminal or civil cases. Spector, Rule 609: A
Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 354 (1979) (Rules 608 and 609
should be abolished because they allow verdicts "based on particular perceived charac-
ter traits or the lack thereof."). As discussed in Part IV, this proposal is unwise; in
some circumstances, character impeachment may be of real value in assessing the credi-
bility of a witness other than an accused.
8. The recent revisions to rule 609 made no changes in this respect.
9. The debate is canvassed in a symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law
of Evidence, 66 B.U.L. REV. 377 (1986). For a definition of the term Bayesian, as used
in this Article, see infra text accompanying note 56.
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pendix provides a diagrammatic presentation, together with a few
simple equations. If the arguments here are sound, they demon-
strate that a Bayesian approach to evidentiary problems has merit.
Legal scholars should stop debating whether or not to use such an
approach. Rather, they should get on with using it, and then ask
whether it produces useful results. This Article suggests that it
does-if the Bayesian approach is used with restraint, understand-
ing, and common sense.
In this case, common sense demands an attempt to understand
the psychology of lying. Although other discussions of the law of
character impeachment have drawn on psychological premises, they
have not explored those premises in depth. Part II of this Article
examines with some care the psychological premises that underlie
my argument and help inform the Bayesian-style reasoning in Parts
III and IV; hence, the somewhat fanciful label "Psycho-Bayesian."
Typically, arguments for restricting character impeachment
evidence are based in part on the premise that prior crimes, at least
violent crimes, generally indicate little about a person's veracity. 10
The argument advanced here against character impeachment of
criminal defendants does not rely on that premise; in fact, it accepts
the premise that prior antisocial behavior, even not involving dis-
honesty, often does indicate a good deal about a person's general
truthtelling inclination. A careful analysis of the situation of the
accused on the witness stand-rather than an easy assumption
about irrelevance-leads to this Article's broad conclusion that
character impeachment evidence of criminal defendants ought to be
eliminated. A similar analysis suggests that in some cases character
impeachment of other witnesses ought to be allowed.
I. A REVIEW OF THE DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE
Subject to exceptions11, qualifications, 12 and evasions, 13 we do
not allow a jury to learn that a person has acted in a given way at a
10. See, e.g., Beaver & Marques, supra note 6, at 600; Spector, supra note 7, at 351
("Character evidence used as a basis for predicting human behavior is useless."); Sur-
ratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested
Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV.
907, 953 (1980); Note, The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach the Credibility of the
Criminal Defendant, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 160, 162 (1969).
11. Rule 404(a) provides three exceptions to the general rule on propensity evi-
dence. The first two apply to certain evidence of the character of an accused, under rule
404(a)(1), and of an alleged victim of a crime, under rule 404(a)(2). The third, upon
which this Article focuses, applies to certain evidence of the character of a witness.
Referred to in rule 404(a)(3), this exception is fully elaborated in rules 608 and 609.
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time not the subject of the present litigation if the only probative
value of the evidence is that it increases the probability that he acted
in a similar way at a material time. 14 Probably the most important
application of this rule is the prohibition against proving prior
crimes committed by a criminal defendant to show that the defend-
ant had a criminal propensity. This prohibition may be based in
part on fear that the jury will overvalue the evidence.' 5 But much
character evidence is highly material; a jury according it great
weight would be acting perfectly rationally.
A more persuasive rationale, perhaps, is that we wish to avoid
having a judicial system that, either in fact or in appearance, judges
a person's character rather than what he has done in the case in
question. A jury that learns that an accused is a "bad person," even
irrespective of how he acted in the case being tried, may effectively
increase the value that it attaches to punishing him if he is guilty
and decrease (or perhaps eliminate) the harm it attaches to punish-
ing him if he is innocent. This shift of interests would cause the
jury, in effect, to lower the burden of persuasion that the law im-
poses on the prosecution.
In any event, the prohibition against propensity evidence is
deeply engrained. Given the prohibition, a violation of it must be
considered prejudicial without regard to whether, in determining
12. See rule 406, which allows "[e]vidence of the habit of a person ... to prove that
the conduct of the person... on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit
.... .FED. R. EVID. 406.
13. See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 6, at 157 ("[E]vidence of an unconnected prior
crime is always evidence of propensity and never evidence of a specific intent to commit
the crime charged."); cf, e.g., United States v. Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir.
1990) (prosecution for mail fraud scheme in which prisoners altered money orders and
arranged for persons outside to cash them; testimony of defendant's mother [1] that two
years earlier the defendant had asked her to participate in a similar plan held admissible
to prove defendant's "knowledge of the scheme and to show the existence of a common
plan or scheme."); United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1988) (prose-
cution for posession of cocaine; proof of prior conviction for same crime is admissible to
counter defense that the defendant did not know the cocaine was in the house and
lacked the intent to distribute it); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1335 (1 1th
Cir. 1982) (proof of racketeering conviction admitted to prove intent because govern-
ment's other proof of intent was "not strong"); United States v. Lea, 618 F.2d 426,
431-32 (7th Cir. 1980) (prosecution of meat buyer for taking kickbacks from meat bro-
kers; testimony that ten or twelve years earlier defendant had solicited kickbacks from
another broker held admissible as proving defendant's "motive and intent," because it
showed that he "had previously sought to establish a relationship with another meat
broker similar to" the one at issue).
14. Eg., FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
15. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404(19) at 404-160
to 404-161 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 38:637
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the facts, the jury likely relied more on the evidence than would be
rational; any reliance at all is deemed improper. And because the
propensity evidence is likely to affect the jury powerfully, both in
guiding its factfinding and in altering the effective burden of proof,
the prejudice is often extreme.
Nevertheless, evidentiary rulemakers have concluded that, be-
cause the jury is so dependent on the testimony of witnesses, it must
have a relatively full base of information on which to assess their
credibility. 16 Thus, notwithstanding the general prohibition against
propensity evidence, a party may impeach a witness, including a
criminal defendant who takes the stand, by showing in any of three
ways that the witness has a poor character for truthfulness.
First, the party may call another witness to present a general
assessment that the primary witness has an untruthful character.
Under rule 608(a), the character witness may do this by testifying
either as to her own opinion of the primary witness's character for
truthfulness or as to her understanding of the first witness's reputa-
tion for truthfulness.
17
Second, the impeaching party, in the discretion of the trial
judge, may cross-examine the primary witness concerning any prior
acts of the witness that suggest she has a bad character for truthful-
ness. 18 Truthtelling inclination is, however, a "collateral" issue, one
that ordinarily should not be allowed to bog down a trial. Thus,
when the only relevance of the prior bad act is to the witness's gen-
eral character for truthfulness, the inquiry is limited to the witness's
own testimony; "extrinsic" evidence is not allowed.' 9
Third, in certain cases, the impeacher may prove that the wit-
ness has been convicted of one or more crimes. 20 Sometimes the
conviction is for a dishonest deed that would itself be admissible for
its bearing on the witness's truthfulness. 2' But, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and in most American jurisdictions, that does
not exhaust the list of crimes that may be admitted for impeach-
16. See, e.g., State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956) ("No
sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is
asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first
thing that they would wish to know.").
17. But cf. MICH. R. EVID. 608(a) (allowing reputation evidence only).
18. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
19. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
20. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
21. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (providing that evidence that a witness has been
convicted of a crime "shall be admitted" to attack the witness's credibility if the crime
"involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.").
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ment. Serious crimes are sometimes deemed to bear sufficiently on
a witness's sense of social responsibility, and so on her truthtelling
ability to warrant admission. For example, rule 609(a)(1), as re-
cently amended, allows proof of a crime that "was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted" 22 if the evidence passes a pre-
scribed balancing test: For a witness other than an accused, the test
is the general one of rule 403, under which evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by the
danger of "unfair prejudice" and other factors; for an accused, the
rule's thumb presses on the other side of the scales, allowing proof
of the conviction only if "the court determines that the .probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the accused."
'23
The rationale for allowing proof of prior convictions, rather
than merely the testimony of the witness acknowledging the under-
lying deeds, appears to have at least two parts. First, the fact of a
conviction is easy and quick to prove and unlikely to be challenged.
Second, a criminal conviction represents a determination by the ju-
dicial system, after its most painstaking type of proceeding, that a
given fact-the defendant's guilt of a crime-is true. The system
has once before relied on that determination, in meting out punish-
ment to the defendant; ordinarily that determination should be usa-
ble for what is, at' least presumptively, a lesser function, namely as
an aid in determining the person's credibility when she takes the
stand in a subsequent trial.
When the witness who is being impeached by proof of his bad
acts is not merely an observer, but a participant in the story that is
the subject of the trial, a serious complication arises: The jury will
be sorely tempted, and often quite rationally so, to treat the bad act
as evidence making it more probable not only that he is lying from
the witness stand but that he acted as alleged in the episode being
22. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
23. Id. In its pre-amendment form, which has been adopted and remains applica-
ble in several states, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, at 609(12), rule
609(a)(1) would allow the evidence if the trial judge determined that its probative value
outweighed "its prejudicial effect to the defendant." In Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), the Supreme Court held that only prejudice to a
criminal defendant must be weighed under this rule; if a crime fitting within rule
609(a)(1) is offered against any other party, admission is mandatory. The 1990 amend-
ment to the rule nullifies this holding for the federal courts in requiring consideration of
prejudice to other parties; on the other hand, the split-level standard of the amendment,
like Green, reflects an understanding that the use of prior convictions for impeachment
raises greater concern when the prejudiced party is an accused than in other contexts.
[Vol. 38:637
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tried. But this type of inference is impermissible, no matter how
rational it may be. The problem arises most frequently in the case
of a criminal defendant, and it is in that context that the prejudice is
most acute.
As a result, the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness is
surrounded by an accumulation of rules addressing not only what
types of crime may be used but also such issues as how recent the
conviction may be and the effect of a pardon or appeal on the ad-
missibility of the evidence. The rules vary substantially from one
jurisdiction to another. One striking aspect of them is that,
although prejudice to an accused is a strong underlying concern,
24
in a given jurisdiction the rules are usually similar structurally, or
even identical, whether or not the witness being impeached is a
criminal defendant.2" And it is also notable that, at least under the
Federal Rules, rulemakers have not found it necessary to prescribe
the same level of detail in the general context of impeachment by
bad acts as they have in the more particular context of impeach-
ment by convictions.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREMISES
The use of character impeachment evidence depends on the as-
sumption that, because a witness has acted in certain ways in the
past, she is more likely to lie in her testimony. Few would challenge
the broad proposition that, in some circumstances, how a person
acts on one occasion sheds some light on how she is likely to act on
24. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
25. Under rule 609, as amended in 1990, impeachment of criminal defendants is
similar to impeachment of other witnesses in that, assuming admissibility is not pre-
cluded by rule 609(b)-(d), the court (1) may, but need not, allow impeachment by
crimes fitting within rule 609(a)(1); (2) must allow impeachment by crimes fitting within
rule 609(a)(2); and (3) may not allow impeachment by other crimes. The only differ-
ence is that the standard used to determine the admissibility of impeachment by a crime
fitting within rule 609(a)(1) depends on whether or not the potentially prejudiced party
is a criminal defendant; see supra text accompanying note 23. Under the older form of
rule 609, as interpreted in Green, the structure was the same except that, for a crime
fitting within rule 609(a)(1), the court could not consider prejudice to a party other than
an accused.
Several states have adopted analogues to the older form of rule 609 that do not
include the "to the defendant" language or any other language suggesting that it is
relevant whether or not the witness being impeached, or the party potentially prejudiced
by the impeachment, is a criminal defendant. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & N. BERGER, supra
note 15, at $ 609(12).
Of the states that have modeled their evidentiary law on the Federal Rules, only
Hawaii and West Virginia explicitly treat impeachment by prior convictions differently
depending on whether or not the witness is a criminal defendant. Id.
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another occasion. But it is no simple matter to state more precise
propositions that can be useful in assessing the value of character
impeachment evidence in particular circumstances.
Part of the problem is that the study of the psychology of de-
ception involves many separate academic literatures, not only that
of personality psychology, but also of clinical, developmental, so-
cial, and abnormal psychology, psychiatry, and criminology. 26
Thus, to the frustration of professionals in the field, no coherent
theory of deception that cuts across the numerous disciplines in-
volved has yet emerged. 27 This Article is clearly not the place to try
to create such a theory. Indeed, the objective here is quite the re-
verse: By applying Occam's Razor 28 to state psychological premises
that are as narrow, unoriginal, and uncontroversial as possible and
that still support the doctrinal argument to follow.
The psychological and psychiatric literature indicates massive
disagreement about the consistency of personality traits. At one ex-
treme are personologist theories, emphasizing the consistency of
broad personality traits and treating behavior largely as a function
of the individual's personality.29 At the other extreme are situation-
ist theories, developed in large part in reaction to broad personolog-
ism. Situationalism doubts broad intrapersonal consistency and
treats behavior largely as a function of environmental or situational
factors.30 In recent years, psychological writing has tended to
center around an intermediate position generally known as interac-
tionism. Interactionism emphasizes the relationship of personality
26. There is also an ethical literature on deception. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
27. Hyman, The Psychology of Deception, 40 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 133, 134,
140, 152 (1989).
28. "[T]he... principle ... that for purposes of explanation things not known to
exist should not, unless it is absolutely necessary, be postulated as existing." 13 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989).
29. E.g., Bern, Constructing Cross-situational Consistencies in Behavior: Some
Thoughts on Alker's Critique of Mischel, 40 J. PERSONALITY 17, 17 (1972) ("For years
personality theorizing has been dominated by the 'trait' assumption that there are per-
vasive cross-situational consistencies in an individual's behavior."); see G. ALLPORT,
PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 18 (1937); Olweus, A Critical
Analysis of the "Modern" Interactionist Position, in PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS
221 (D. Magnusson & N. Endler eds. 1977) (citing Ekehammer, Interactionism in Per-
sonalityfrom a Historical Perspective, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 1026, 1026 (1974)).
30. Olweus, supra note 29, at 221 (citing Ekehammer, supra note 29, at 1026). The
classic situationalist work is W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968); see,
e.g., id. at 281-82 ("Although behavior patterns often may be stable, they usually are
not highly generalized across situations. . . . [B]ehaviors depend on highly specific
events .. ").
[Vol. 38:637
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traits and situational factors and treats behavior as a function of
both.31
The value of interactionism as a coherent theory and as a pro-
gram for research is sometimes challenged, but its basic postulate
seems widely accepted. For example, Richard Nisbett, a prominent
skeptic of interactionism, denies that "a chief goal of personality
research should be to seek for person-situation interactions," and
yet he shares the belief that such interactions are "widespread and
important. '
32
A consensus on that general belief does not answer the difficult
questions, of course. For example, suppose that Adam and Eve
both have a greater tendency to lie in Situation A than in Situation
B (revealing the importance of situation) and that Adam has a
greater tendency than Eve does to lie in Situation A (revealing the
importance of personality). Will Adam have a greater tendency
than Eve to lie in Situation B? The closer Situation A is to Situation
B, the more likely the answer is to be affirmative. Researchers differ
as to how disparate the situations may be before the correlation be-
tween a person's behavior in one situation and in another dimin-
ishes to insignificance.
Mercifully, sound analysis of the value of character impeach-
ment evidence does not depend on resolution of this general psycho-
logical issue, nor even on a complete understanding of the
importance of personality and of situation in determining the likeli-
hood of a person telling the truth. The arguments presented in
Parts III and IV of this Article rely on four premises that are intui-
tively appealing, and at least three of which would find broad con-
sensus among students of personality. The first two, emphasizing
31. See, e.g., Mischel, The Interaction of Person and Situation, in PERSONALITY AT
THE CROSSROADS, supra note 29, at 333, 334 (there is "compelling evidence that com-
plex human behavior is regulated by interactions that depend intimately on situational
conditions..."); see also Magnusson & Endler, Interactional Psychology: Present Status
and Future Prospects, in PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 29, at 3, 4:
A basic element in th[e interactionist] model ... is the focus on the ongo-
ing, multidirectional interaction between an individual and his or her en-
vironment, especially the situations in which behavior occurs. Persons
and situations are regarded as indispensably linked to one another during
the process of interaction. Neither the person factors nor the situation
factors per se determine behavior in isolation; it is determined by insepa-
rable person by situation interactions. This view has the consequence
that research has to focus simultaneously on person factors, situation fac-
tors, and the interaction between these two systems.
Id. at 4.
32. Nisbett, Interaction Versus Main Effects as Goals of Personality Research, in
PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 29, at 235, 235.
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situational factors, have a particular bearing on the analysis in Part
III concerning the use of character impeachment evidence against
criminal defendants; these are nearly self-evident. The other two
premises, emphasizing personal factors, are particularly related to
the argument presented in Part IV about character impeachment of
other witnesses.
Premise 1: Almost anyone will tell the truth if the conse-
quences of doing so are in the person's interests.
Premise 2: Most people will be willing to lie if they think
they can do so persuasively and the consequences of telling the
truth are sufficiently dire.
Clearly a situationalist would find these first two propositions
very hospitable; they put almost total emphasis on the situation
rather than on differences among persons.3 3 But a personologist
should also find them easily acceptable.34 No one seriously con-
tends that people act consistently all the time. Even assuming that
some people have a strong tendency to lie, they will not usually do
so if it is against their interests: if the truth helps, why avoid it?a5
Thus Premise 1 seems almost indisputable. And Premise 2 seems
nearly as strongly founded. How dire the consequences of the truth
must be before a person is willing to tell a lie may differ from person
to person, but it would be hard to deny that virtually everybody has
a tipping point. For many people, and probably for most, the threat
of serious criminal punishment is sufficient.
36
33. Note this conclusion from the classic precursor of situationalism: "Most chil-
dren will deceive in certain situations and not in others." 1 H. HARTSHORNE & M.
MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER: STUDIES IN DECEIT 411 (1928).
34. S. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND (1984), written from a strongly
personological orientation, supports both premises. As to Premise 1, Samenow con-
tends that even a delinquent, whose lying "appears to be compulsive," really has it
"totally under his control. He can readily distinguish truth from falsehood and is pre-
pared to tell either, depending on which best serves his purpose." Id. at 37. And as to
Premise 2, Samenow writes that "[a]ll children may lie at one time or another ....
Occasionally they lie to cover up wrongdoing, to save face in an embarrassing situation,
to avoid an uncomfortable situation, or to protect their image." Id. at 36.
35. This is not to deny that in some situations people may lie for the sake of lying,
and that some people, perhaps pathologically, do so with some frequency. Cf J.D.
SALINGER, CATCHER IN THE RYE 16 (1951); see infra notes 46-49, and accompanying
text. But at least in most situations of importance, most people will not lie if doing so
significantly harms their other interests.
36. Cf infra note 40. It would be essentially impossible to design and implement
any kind of realistic experiment, consistent with ethical standards, that would show the
prevalence of dishonesty by people facing dire consequences for telling the truth. Fur-
ther inferential support for Premise 2 is provided by studies showing how widespread
dishonesty is in various contexts not involving consequences nearly so dire as the threat
of criminal punishment-such as students' academic work, e.g., Singhal, Factors in Stu-
dents' Dishonesty, 51 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 775 (1982), sports, e.g., Erffmeyer, Rule-
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Premise 3: In the intermediate range, how strong an interest
will induce a person to lie will differ from one person to another;
some people will tend to lie if the consequences of telling the
truth are only moderately averse, whereas others will tend to ad-
here to the truth at least until it hurts very badly.
In contrast to the first two premises, this one will be most com-
fortable to personologists; whatever resistance it arouses is likely to
come from those who tend towards a situationalist orientation.
And yet most situationalists probably would find this premise
acceptable.
Despite some caricatures of early situationalist work, few situa-
tionalists have ever seriously denied that there is such a thing as
personality or that some individuals tend more than others to act in
a given way in response to certain situations. 37 Indeed, support for
Premise 3 may be found in the work of the pioneering situationalist
Walter Mischel. As Mischel maintains, the general question "Are
persons or situations more important?" is misleading and unanswer-
able. Mischel poses a more subtle question: "When are situations
most likely to exert powerful effects and, conversely, when are per-
son variables likely to be most influential?" In response, he offers
the following construct:
Psychological "situations" (stimuli, treatment) are powerful to
the degree that they lead everyone to construe the particular
Violating Behavior on the Golf Course, 59 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 591 (1984),
and returning excess change or "dropped" coins, e.g., Hays, Honesty Requiring a Self-
Initiated Response, 46 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 87 (1980).
Premise 2 is worded in terms of people's inclination to lie if they think they can do
so persuasively. The premise is worded in this limited manner because if a defendant is
dissuaded from lying on the witness stand by fear that he will make himself worse off if
he lies and is exposed than if he does not testify, the supposed need for impeachment
eidence never comes into play. Interestingly, the literature supports the proposition
that more people would deceive if they felt they could get away with it. Hays, supra, at
89 ("Whether or not the individual perceives the chances of being successful in dishon-
est conduct as highly unlikely determines any resulting behavior."); Singhal, supra, at
776 (48% of the respondents in a student survey answered affirmatively to the question:
"Does examination monitoring prevent you from cheating?").
37. See, e.g., W. MISCHEL, supra note 30, at 37 ("Consistency coefficients averag-
ing between .30 and .40 ... can be taken either as evidence for the relative specificity of
the particular behaviors, or as support for the presence of underlying generality."); Mis-
chel, supra note 31, at 334 ("I know no one who seriously doubts that lives have coher-
ence and that we perceive ourselves and others as relatively stable individuals that have
substantial identity and continuity over time, even when our specific actions change.");
Mischel, Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization of Personality, 80
PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 252, 254 (1973) ("The position developed in Mischel's (1968)
Personality and Assessment has been widely misunderstood to imply that people show
no consistencies, that individual differences are unimportant, and that 'situations' are
the main determinants of behavior.").
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events the same way, induce uniform expectancies regarding the
most appropriate response pattern... and require skills that eve-
ryone has to the same extent . . . . Conversely, situations are
weak to the degree that they are not uniformly encoded, do not
generate uniform expectancies concerning the desired behavior,
do not offer sufficient incentives for its performance, or fail to
provide the learning conditions required for successful genesis of
the behavior .... To the degree that people are exposed to pow-
erful treatments, the role of the individual differences among
them are minimized. Conversely, when treatments are weak,
ambiguous, or trivial, individual differences in person variables
should have the most significant effects.
38
In these terms, Premises 1 and 2 address situations at the two
poles, in which people are "exposed to powerful treatments." Just
as we expect a uniform response to a green or red traffic light (the
example provided by Mischel of a "powerful stimulus"3 9), we ex-
pect the situational factors in these situations to determine most
people's behavior. Premise 3 addresses the weak, intermediate situ-
ation-comparable to that of the yellow light-that presents an in-
centive to lie, but not an overwhelming one. In this intermediate
range, "individual differences in person variables" may have a sig-
nificant impact on behaviorA0
38. Mischel, supra note 31, at 346-47 (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Bowers,
Personal Consistency, in PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 29, at 70
("Specific behaviors are not only engendered by specific contexts, they must be under-
stood in terms of the particular context and person under consideration-and such un-
derstanding oftentimes requires going beyond the immediate situational and behavioral
givens."); id. at 71-73 (In planned or constrained environments the situation appears to
have the greatest impact on behavior, but "at the level of more naturalistic observation
... personal consistencies begin to emerge.").
39. Mischel, supra note 31, at 347.
40. H. HARTSHORNE & M. MAY, supra note 33, a famous work studying grade-
school children, appears to be the most comprehensive quantitative examination to date
of lying. Hartshorne and May concluded that honesty is primarily a function of situa-
tional factors rather than of personality characteristics. But their data do provide some
support for a finding that personality bears on a person's inclination to lie; although the
behavior of most of the children depended on the exact specifics of the situation, there
were groups at each end for whom environmental factors apparently would have to be
rather strong to exert significant control over behavior. M. FELDMAN, CRIMINAL BE-
HAVIOUR: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 151 (1977). See also Burton, Generality of
Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 481 (1963) (reanalyzing the Harts-
home and May data, and emphasizing the mixed impact of personality and situation);
Hays, supra note 36, at 87 ("Several studies ... have shown that individuals vary in
level of honesty as a function of the situation. It is also well established that individual
characteristics are important determiners of honesty .... ").
In any event, the Hartshorne and May studies are of limited relevance to under-
standing lying in adults, because the children were "too young to have achieved the
character stages required before consistency in moral behavior properly could be ex-
pected." Block, Advancing the Psychology of Personality: Paradigmatic Shift or Improv-
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Certainly the law of evidence has always acted on the assump-
tion that, at least in some situations, a person's individual propensi-
ties may say a good deal about her likelihood of lying under oath: if
that were not so, then there never would be reason to admit charac-
ter impeachment evidence. Virtually nobody seriously contends
that character impeachment evidence should be altogether
foreclosed.
41
Premise 3, then, seems eminently sensible and generally accept-
able in both the legal and psychological communities. By itself,
though, it does not take us far enough. We may know in the ab-
stract that people differ in their readiness to lie. But the practical
question that an adjudicative system must answer is how to assess a
particular witnesses's readiness to lie in a given situation. In other
words, what past behaviors might rationally lead a factfinder to
conclude that this witness is more likely than most people to lie in
this situation? One need not offer a comprehensive answer to this
question, or even a detailed approach for answering it. Instead, this
Article uses only the following premise.
Premise 4: Given that the interest inducing a person to lie is
in the intermediate range addressed by Premise 3, an assessment
by another of how likely the person is to lie under oath may be
rationally affected by information that the person previously has
committed antisocial behavior, even if not involving dishonesty,
of a type that most people would not commit.
This is the only one of the four premises that might appear
controversial. Luckily, the Article does not lean on it heavily.
Although Part III contends that Premise 4 provides some unex-
pected support for the principal argument of this Article, that char-
acter impeachment evidence of criminal defendants ought not be
allowed, the premise is not at all essential to that argument. It
comes into play more directly in Part IV, which argues that in some
circumstances impeachment of other witnesses by crimes not in-
volving dishonesty may be appropriate; even there, though, Premise
4 is not critical to the main point, that with respect to witnesses
other than criminal defendants the admission of prior convictions
ought not be determined by categorical rules.
Those with a situationalist orientation might rebel at the
thought that past behavior not even involving dishonesty could in-
ing the Quality of Research?, in PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 29, at
37, 40. Indeed, Hartshorne and May found greater consistency in the older children.
M. FELDMAN, supra, at 151.
41. But see Spector, supra note 7.
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dicate very much about whether a person is likely to lie on a given
occasion. But Premise 4 is limited to previous "antisocial behavior
of a type that most people would not commit." It thus takes us out
of the realm of ordinary personality psychology.
Just as, in Mischel's terms, "powerful" situations may have a
greater impact than weaker ones on behavior, "powerful" (in the
sense of extreme) personal variables may have a greater impact than
more common ones.42 Thus, notwithstanding the "specificity ver-
sus consistency" debate in ordinary personality psychology, crimi-
nologists seem to be in consensus that various different deviant
behaviors are positively correlated. Despite debate over the extent
to which different deviant behaviors may be regarded as alternative
manifestations of the same general deviant tendency, criminologists
seem to agree that such a general tendency accounts for some signif-
icant portion of the variance in specific deviant behaviors. 4
3
Lying appears to be a particularly difficult type of behavior to
study quantitatively-perhaps because it is difficult to detect and is
rarely prosecuted, and perhaps because everybody lies occasion-
ally.44 Testing Premise 4, moreover, would demand more than a
generalized study of lying; obviously, it would be difficult, at best, to
design an experiment to show quantitatively that those who have
committed serious antisocial behavior tend to commit a given type
of dishonest behavior more frequently than do other people.
Nevertheless, nonquantitative learning suggests that lying is
closely related to a general deviant tendency. In an exhaustive
study conducted over more than a decade at St. Elizabeths Hospital
in Washington, D.C.,45 Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow
identified a pattern of thinking processes that they labeled as "crim-
inal," not in the legal sense but in contrast to the comparable
processes of the "basically responsible person."' 46 They concluded
that:
Both the criminal and the noncriminal lie, and each knows when
he is doing it. For the criminal, however, lying is a way of life.
42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; M. FELDMAN, supra note 40, at 151
(For the minority of students who tended to consistent honesty or consistent dishonesty,
situational factors would have to be rather powerful to exert significant control over
behavior.).
43. Osgood, Johnston, O'Malley & Bachman, The Generality of Deviance in Late
Adolescence and Early Adulthood, 53 AM. Soc. REV. 81, 81, 89 (1988); Steffensmeier,
On the Cause of "White-Collar" Crime: An Assessment of Hirschi and Gottfredson's
Claims, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 345, 345 (1989).
44. For a discussion of the famous Hartshorne and May studies, see supra note 40.
45. 1 S. YOCHELSON & S. SAMENOW, THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY (1976).
46. Id. at 253.
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Without exception, lying is incorporated into every criminal's
makeup and is a nutrient of criminal patterns. To choose to be in
crime necessitates lying for self-preservation.
47
According to Yochelson and Samenow, "[flying to achieve specific
aims" begins "very early in the criminal's life."' 4  The criminal
"goes by what is right for him at the time .... By lying, he merely
does what he needs to do to promote himself and achieve his
objectives." 49
These criminological findings50 are perfectly in accord with the
psychiatric doctrine that some people place significantly less weight
than do most on social norms and the welfare of others. In the
latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM-III-
R"), the American Psychiatric Association describes Antisocial
Personality Disorder ("APD"), the "essential feature [of which] is a
pattern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior beginning in child-
hood or early adolescence and continuing into adulthood":
Lying, stealing, truancy, vandalism, initiating fights, running
away from home, and physical cruelty are typical childhood
signs. In adulthood the antisocial pattern continues .... These
people fail to conform to social norms and repeatedly perform
antisocial acts that are grounds for arrest, such as destroying
property, harassing others, stealing, and having an illegal occu-
pation .... People with Antisocial Personality Disorder tend to
be irritable and aggressive and to get repeatedly into physical
fights and assaults, including spouse- or child-beating.... [T]hey
generally have no remorse about the effects of their behavior on
others; they may even feel justified in having hurt or mistreated
others. 51
To be diagnosed as having APD, a person must have shown a
substantial history of Conduct Disorder-a "junior" form of
APD-before age 15, as demonstrated by various forms of conduct,
47. Id. at 348; accord id. at 23 ("To these men, lying was nearly as essential-
indeed, automatic-as breathing.").
48. Id. at 351.
49. Id. at 356; see also Tuck & Riley, The Theory of Reasoned Action: A Decision
Theory of Crime, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES
ON OFFENDING 156 (D. Cornish & R. Clarke eds. 1986). Tuck and Riley find the basic
findings of Yochelson and Samenow "convincing," id. at 165, and suggest how they
might be incorporated into the theory of reasoned action ("TORA"), a broad theory of
intentional behavior that Tuck and Riley attempt to apply to criminal conduct. Id. at
164-65.
50. See also Bishop, Legal and Extralegal Barriers to Delinquency, 22 CRIMINOL-
oGY 403 (1984) ("[I]nternalized normative constraint[s]" have more impact than fear of
formal or informal sanctions in restraining delinquency.).
51. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 342 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
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including initiation of physical fights, use of a weapon, forcing sex-
ual activity, physical cruelty to animals or other people, destruction
of property, and frequent lying other than to avoid physical or sex-
ual abuse.52 Furthermore, the person must have displayed a "pat-
tern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior since the age of 15."
Among the indicators of such a pattern are that the person
(2) fails to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behav-
ior, as indicated by repeatedly performing antisocial acts that are
grounds for arrest (whether arrested or not), e.g., destroying
property, harassing others, stealing, pursuing an illegal occupa-
tion...
(6) has no regard for the truth, as indicated by repeated lying,
use of aliases, or "conning" others for personal profit or pleasure
(10) lacks remorse (feels justified in having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another) .. .53
In other words, a low regard for one's obligation to tell the
truth is often part of a broader pattern in which the person places
little weight on social norms or on the welfare of others. It follows
that significant previous antisocial activity, even activity not in itself
involving dishonesty, may be an indicator-though not necessarily
a compelling one-of a heightened readiness to lie.
The point must not be overstated. A person who has commit-
ted a significant crime cannot necessarily be characterized as having
a general deviant tendency, a criminal personality, or APD. Con-
versely, a person so characterized will not necessarily lie more read-
ily than other people, and a person not so characterized will not
necessarily lie less than others. There are, presumably, honest mug-
gers and gentle perjurers. But the law of evidence cannot afford to
demand anything close to certainty. It must content itself with
seeking factors that significantly alter probabilities.
This discussion has suggested that there is a correlation be-
tween past antisocial behavior and readiness to lie, a correlation sig-
nificant enough that in some cases evidence of the past behavior
may rationally affect-that is, alter incrementally-a factfinder's as-
sessment of how likely the person is to advance his personal inter-
ests by lying under oath. This, of course, has a bearing on the
question of admissibility. It does not mean, however, that in all
cases a prior record of one or more serious crimes has sufficient
probative value with respect to the witness' credibility to warrant
admissibility.
52. Id. at 344-45, 355.
53. Id. at 345-46.
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III. THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AS WITNESS
Suppose Defoe is the defendant in a robbery trial. Prosecution
witnesses, whom the jury finds quite credible, have identified Defoe
as the culprit. The prosecution has rested, and a motion to dismiss
the charges has failed. Now Defoe contemplates testifying in his
own defense that he was nowhere near the scene. If he does so, the
prosecution will seek on cross-examination to elicit Defoe's ac-
knowledgment that the previous year he committed forgery and was
convicted for it, and on rebuttal to introduce the testimony of an-
other witness that in her opinion Defoe has a poor character for
truthfulness.
This Part analyzes the benefits and dangers of allowing such
character impeachment evidence. The analysis is broken into two
sections. Section A examines the probative value and prejudicial
impact of the evidence itself, apart from the question of how the
prospect of impeachment may alter the defendant's courtroom con-
duct; the analysis assumes that the defendant decides to testify.
Section B then examines the dynamic aspect of the problem-the
pressure that the impeachment rule puts on the defendant to stay off
the stand, and the bearing that this has on the factfinding process.
A. Character Impeachment Evidence of Criminal Defendants:
Much Prejudice, Little Value
The probative value of evidence is a relative matter, depending
on the extent to which the evidence alters the probability of a mate-
rial factual proposition. 54 Thus, we can determine the probative
value of the evidence by comparing how probable that proposition
appeared before the evidence was presented with how probable it
appears afterwards."
This Article uses a Bayesian approach to analyze the determi-
nation of probabilities. The term "Bayesian" refers to a framework
for quantifying uncertainty according to subjective probability as-
sessments, or degrees of belief, and for revising those assessments in
the light of acquired evidence. 56 The approach does not assume
54. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
55. See, e.g., Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U.L. REV. 733,
738-39 (1986).
56. See Fienberg & Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presen-
tation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.L. REV. 771,
771-73 (1986). The term owes its name to Bayes' Theorem, one of its cornerstones,
which was first presented by an eighteenth-century English cleric, Thomas Bayes. The
theorem is illustrated diagrammatically in the Appendix.
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that people actually break down inquiries into discrete probability
assessments, or that they ordinarily should do so. Rather, the
premise of the approach is that rational factfinders implicitly act
consistently with subjective probability assessments applied in ac-
cordance with the rules of probability.5 7 The Appendix includes a
brief diagrammatic presentation of how the Bayesian approach may
be applied to evidentiary questions generally, to the evaluation of
testimony, and to the issue discussed in this Part.
The Appendix illustrates diagrammatically an argument I have
made elsewhere, that, in evaluating the probability of a proposition
in light of testimony as to that proposition, the jury in essence must
assess three probabilities:
1. The probability of the proposition apart from the testimony.
2. The probability that the witness would give this testimony if
it were true.
3. The probability that the witness would give this testimony if
it were not true.58
The higher the first probability, and the higher the ratio of the sec-
ond to the third, the higher the probability of the proposition in
light of the testimony. Thus, if a defense witness testifies to a given
proposition favorable to Defoe, the prosecution ideally would like
to show that the first and second probabilities are relatively low and
that the third is relatively high. If the prosecution can show that
the second and third probabilities are equal-that the witness would
be as likely to give this testimony if it were true as she would if it
were false-then the testimony itself has no value; it does not alter
the probability of the material proposition.
The focus for now is on how character impeachment evidence
affects the jury's evaluation of the defendant's own testimony to an
exculpatory version of the facts. We can analyze this effect by ex-
amining the extent to which, legitimately or prejudicially, the im-
peachment evidence might alter each of the three probability
assessments. Although some readers may regard this discussion as
overly segmented, breaking up what should be one big picture into
many small pieces, the discussion is deliberately analytical. Its in-
tricacy is warranted not only by the demands of logical rigor, but
also by the complexity of the evidentiary law being examined,
57. See Friedman, A Diagrammatic Approach to Evidence, 66 B.U.L. REV. 571,
576-80 (1986).
58. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 676
(1987). See generally id. at 667-68; Friedman, supra note 57, at 582-84.
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which prescribes that character impeachment may be considered on
one type of issue but not on another.
1. The First Probability Assessment
By definition, the first probability assessment-the probability,
as judged apart from the defendant's testimony, of the substantive
proposition to which he has testified-is logically unaltered by the
defendant's testimony. Accordingly, evidence of the defendant's
untruthful character admitted merely to impeach that testimony
can have no legitimate effect on this probability assessment.
The evidence very likely will have a highly prejudicial impact
on that assessment, however. The jury is likely to conclude that,
because the defendant committed a prior bad act, the probability
that he committed the crime charged, assessed without taking his
testimony into account, is much higher. Rational though such an
inference may be, the jury could well draw it too strongly. In any
event, the possibility that the jury will draw this inference is pre-
cisely the type of consequence that rule 404 and similar rules are
meant to prevent. So too is the possibility that the jury will decide
that the defendant is a bad person, and thus effectively lower the
prosecution's burden of persuasion. A limiting instruction is un-
likely to correct these problems. 59 Just how serious this potential
prejudice is may be inferred from the fact that, to avoid it, many
defendants decline to testify, thus giving up a right of enormous
importance and risking that the jury will draw an adverse inference
from silence.
2. The Second Probability Assessment
The second probability assessment requires the jury to deter-
mine, on the assumption that the substance of the defendant's testi-
mony is accurate, how likely it is that the defendant would give that
59. See Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the
Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 93-95 (1972) (In a jury
simulation experiment, "judge's instructions" to use prior convictions only in judging
credibility "had no effect whatsoever on the decisions by the subjects."); Wissler & Saks,
On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence
to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985) (reporting an empirical study
suggesting that "the presentation of the defendant's criminal record does not affect the
defendant's credibility, but does increase the likelihood of conviction, and that the
judge's limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error."). See generally
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) ("The naive assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know
to be unmitigated fiction.") (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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testimony. In the usual case this probability is very high: An inno-
cent defendant has a strong motive to testify truthfully and no rea-
son to testify falsely, unless he is a pathological liar or has a martyr
complex. These factors are not altered in any way by the fact that
the defendant has a generally poor character for truthfulness. As
Premise 1 suggests, even an inveterate liar will usually tell the truth
if it will help save his skin.6°
3. The Third Probability Assessment
The third probability assessment requires the jury to deter-
mine, on the assumption that the exculpatory rendition to which
the defendant has testified is not true, how likely it is that the de-
fendant would give that testimony. In the ordinary case, in other
words, it calls for the jury to ask, "Assuming the defendant is guilty,
how likely is it that he would testify in this way that he is inno-
cent?" This question might appear to conflict with the presumption
of innocence, but it does not; that presumption is satisfied if the jury
is instructed, in effect, to begin with a very low assessment of the
first probability, before the prosecution has introduced any evi-
dence. On the contrary, this third inquiry is the key question in
assessing the credibility of a defendant who takes the stand in his
own defense. It requires some care to analyze correctly.
In some cases there may be explanations other than insincerity
as to how the accused might have come to give false exculpatory
testimony. In particular, he may have misperceived or misremem-
bered some of the events as to which he has testified. 6' For present
purposes, however, these possibilities can be disregarded because
the subject of this Article, impeachment by bad character for truth-
fulness, has no bearing on them. Instead, we can focus on what is
usually the most likely explanation for the variance of an accused's
testimony from the truth-lying.
Therefore the jury's key question may be rephrased more nar-
rowly: "Assuming that the accused is guilty, how likely is it that he
would lie from the stand in this way?" Further subdividing this
question, the jury can ask, on the assumption that the accused com-
mitted the crime with which he is charged: (a) How probable is it
that the accused would be inclined to lie in his own defense? and (b)
How probable is it that the accused, if inclined to lie, would be able
60. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Of course, even an innocent
defendant may not testify at all; this possibility, which for now we have assumed away,
is discussed in section B of this Part.
61. Friedman, supra note 58, at 686-88.
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to testify the way he has, in terms of substance and demeanor? To
determine the impact of the character impeachment evidence, we
will want to know how different are the jury's assessments of these
probabilities before and after introduction of that evidence.
a. Probability of the Accused's Inclination to Tell
the Self-Serving Lie
Whether a person is inclined to tell a self-serving lie in a given
situation depends on the relative weight of the interests that the lie
would serve and the person's compunctions about lying. Character
impeachment is unlikely to alter the jury's view of these factors very
much at all. Surprising as this assertion may seem, it follows easily
from the hypothesis governing this part of the analysis-that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged. On that hypothesis, a ra-
tional jury usually will conclude, even without character impeach-
ment, that the accused has a strong interest in lying and little
compunction against doing so. Character impeachment evidence is
overkill.
i. The Accused's Interest in Lying
The personal interest that the accused has at stake-avoiding
criminal punishment-is an extremely powerful one. It is highly
unlikely that this interest will appear materially different if the jury
learns that he has committed a prior crime, or more generally that
he has a bad character for truthfulness. Some former convicts may
have an especially strong interest in avoiding the relatively harsh
treatment accorded repeat offenders;62 on the other hand, the
stigma and pain of a criminal conviction may be duller the second
time around. But these fine-tuned considerations almost certainly
will not alter the essential truth by very much: a criminal defend-
ant, whatever his character or prior record, has a very strong inter-
est in avoiding conviction.
ii. The Accused's Compunctions About Lying
As Premise 2 indicates, many people, probably most, would
tell a lie if they believed it would save their skins, at least if it would
prevent their skins from being sent to prison or suffering other crim-
62. Cf R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 211
n.54 (1977) (unavailability of relatively lenient plea bargains sometimes induces defend-
ants with prior records to stand trial).
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inal punishment. 63 Only those towards the self-abnegatory end of
the spectrum will have sufficient compunction that they will not be
inclined to tell a lie, if they can, to escape criminal punishment.
By the hypothesis of the question and even without any im-
peachment, the accused appears not to be one of those people; on
the contrary, he already appears to be. one of those towards the
other end of the spectrum, who is more willing than most people to
weigh his own interests over his social responsibilities.64 According
to Premise 4, serious prior misconduct makes it more likely that a
person is readily willing to lie for his own interests. And by hypoth-
esis, the accused is not an ordinary person but a criminal; he has
committed the crime with which he is now being charged.65 Thus,
for this part of its inquiry, the jury will probably assess the ac-
cused's compunction about lying as extremely low, even before the
prosecution introduces any character impeachment evidence. This
conclusion would not be materially altered if Premise 4 is, in fact
untrue, because most jurors are likely to believe it is true.66
63. See supra text accompanying notes 36 and 40. Note that, "recognizing and
tolerating this frequently instinctive desire of the guilty defendant to play the innocent,
modern continental systems generally refuse to put the defendant on oath." Damaska,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Compara-
tive Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 528 (1973). Cf. Dalton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77
n.7 (defandant in Georgia trial "made a lengthy unsworn statement").
64. One interesting counterexample sheds light on this point rather than undercuts
it. According to my colleague Doug Kahn, the late Rep. Otis G. Pike told of con-
ducting his own defense, very vigorously, in a trial involving a minor hunting violation.
Pike knew he was guilty, and would not take the stand to perjure himself. One might
wonder whether Pike would have taken the same stance had the crime been more seri-
ous and he felt that he could have gotten away with a lie. And, of course, if the crime
had been more serious, then arguably at least, the Otis Pike who had such scruples
would not have committed it.
65. In this case we have assumed that, if the defendant's self-exculpatory statement
is a lie, then he is guilty of the crime charged. That is probably most often true, but it is
not inevitably so. An innocent defendant could gild his story, lying about a peripheral
part of the case. Cf T.. WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 622 (1987). The
discussion here, however, focuses on the most important case, in which the truthfulness
of the defendant's testimony implies innocence and falsity implies guilt.
66. To the extent that exclusion of an accused's prior convictions is based on fear
that the jury will overvalue the evidence in judging the accused's credibility, it reflects a
perception that lay people strongly believe Premise 4 to be true. Similarly, to the extent
that prior convictions, including convictions for crimes different in nature from the one
currently being charged, are excluded to prevent the jury from overvaluing their bearing
on the defendant's guilt, see text accompanying note 15, the exclusion represents a per-
ception that lay people will likely rely on the cross-situational propensity theory re-
flected in Premise 4. Moreover, arguments by courts and other rulemakers favoring the
use of character impeachment evidence often rely on variants of Premise 4. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text. There is no reason to believe that the perception of
jurors is less favorable to Premise 4 than is the perception of the rulemakers in particu-
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This conclusion means that the prosecution has no remaining
battle to fight on this part of the case, because it need persuade the
jury only that the accused is not towards the high-compunction end
of the spectrum. By the governing hypothesis, the jury already has
an indication that the accused falls far from that end, and indeed
near the other, low-compunction end of the spectrum. The prose-
cution does not need to introduce evidence further suggesting that
the accused falls towards the low-compunction end. Such evidence
is overkill in two respects. First, the proposition it tends to prove is
a stronger one than the prosecution needs to show. Second, the
evidence primarily adds confirmation to what the jury is already
assuming hypothetically; thus, it is essentially cumulative and so
lacks great probative value.
In particular, proof that the defendant committed a prior crime
simply increases from one to two the number of crimes the defend-
ant is assumed to have committed. Courts have recognized that
prior convictions offered to prove bad character for truthfulness
may be cumulative after a point.67 But they should also recognize
lar. If Premise 4 is incorrect, there is no good reason to believe that jurors are more
likely than rulemakers to recognize its incorrectness. For a good illustration of the
popular appeal of Premise 4, note the comment of Sen. John McClellan, opposing in
floor debate a version of rule 609 that would have allowed impeachment by convictions
only for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement:
Surely a person who has committed a serious crime-a felony-will just
as readily lie under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor
involving lying. Would a convicted rapist, cold-blooded murderer or
armed robber really hesitate to lie under oath any more than a person
who has previously lied? Would a convicted murderer or robber be more
truthful than such a person?
Of course not!
120 CONG. REC. 37,076-77 (1974), quoted in United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348,
367 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
67. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (suggesting as
a possible rule that proof of at most one conviction for a crime similar to that being
currently charged be admissible for impeachment), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968);
People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436, 460, 690 P.2d 1207, 1221, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547, 561 (1984)
(Bird, C.J., concurring in the result) ("Multiple prior felony convictions carry little, if
any, additional probative value in determining the credibility of a witness."); United
States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 738 (3d Cir. 1978) (No prejudice
created by Government when, in questioning its own witness, it elicited four prior fel-
ony convictions but ignored three others; "[t]he unrevealed convictions are merely cu-
mulative as to the issue of [the witness's] credibility."); cf Commonwealth v. Reid, 22
Mass. App. Ct. 730, 732, 497 N.E.2d 1107, 1108 (1986) ("Like most cumulative evi-
dence, the marginal value of successive convictions for impeachment purposes tends to
diminish...."), rev'd, 400 Mass. 534, 511 N.E. 2d 331 (1987). But see Holt, 37 Cal. 3d
at 452-53, 690 P.2d at 1216, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (majority opinion holding that "[a]
series of crimes relevant to character for truthfulness is more probative of credibility
than a single lapse," but that the trial judge did not sufficiently weigh against this proba-
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that in this context cumulativeness begins with the first prior con-
viction rather than with the second because, by hypothesis, the ac-
cused has committed the crime charged.68
There is a large irony here. Arguments favoring the use of
character impeachment evidence often rely on variants of Premise
4.69 But in the context of an accused witness, the logic suggests that
tive value the prejudicial effect of admitting more than one conviction) (citation omit-
ted); People v. Woodle, 121 Mich. App. 336, 334, 328 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1982)
(Evidence of several armed robberies held "very probative of credibility," but too preju-
dicial because defendant on trial for felony murder with armed robbery as the underly-
ing felony; at retrial, proof of only one prior conviction to be allowed for
impeachment.).
68. At some point, prejudicial impact might also become cumulative. Recall the
nature of the prejudice threatened by character impeachment evidence. It may increase
the jury's first probability assessment listed above-the probability of guilt, assessed
apart from the accused's own testimony-by suggesting that the accused is a bad person
who would be disposed to commit the crime. See text preceding supra note 59. Past a
point, additional evidence of bad character may increase the force of this view only
slightly, and so have only slight incremental prejudice. But ordinarily this type of cu-
mulativeness does not begin until evidence of the second prior bad act, at the earliest.
Cf Commonwealth v. Reid, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 732, 497 N.E.2d 1107, 1108 (1986)
(when "successive convictions for impeachment purposes" are presented, "the danger
paradoxically increases that the jury will conclude that the defendant is an incurable
criminal from whom society deserves protection regardless of any doubts they might
have concerning his guilt of the particular offense charged."), rev'd, 400 Mass. 534, 511
N.E. 2d 331 (1987). The first probability assessment, unlike the third, does not assume
hypothetically that the accused committed the crime. Absent character evidence, there-
fore, the jury makes that first assessment, of the probability that the accused committed
the crime charged, against an assumed background of a blameless past; proof of prior
misconduct substantially alters that background. Note the contrast with the third
probability assessment. That assessment requires the jury to determine the probability
that the defendant would commit one type of misconduct-pejury in the case being
tried-assuming that he had previously committed another-the crime charged.
69. See, e.g., Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (Holmes, J.), quoted
in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 506 n.4 (1989) (prior conviction
may suggest that a witness "is of bad character and unworthy of credit" because of "the
general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show."); State v.
Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293-94, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956) ("Lack of trustworthiness may
be evinced by [a defendant-witness's] abiding and repeated contempt for laws which he
is legally and morally bound to obey.... though the violations are not concerned solely
with crimes involving 'dishonesty and false statement' "); State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d
.542, 549 (Tenn. 1984) (Crimes "involving disregard of legal and moral rules of civilized
society and serious enough to be punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year"
may have sufficient bearing on credibility to warrant admissibility even though they
have "nothing to do with dishonesty or false statement."); 120 CONG. REc. 2380 (Feb.
6, 1974) (Rep. Hogan) ("You simply cannot get away from the fact that, if a thief or
perjurer is unworthy of belief, one might be even less inclined to believe a murderer, or
assassin, or drug trafficker, or white slaver, or saboteur or what have you."); id. at 2381
(Rep. Lott) ("Obviously, the character of a witness is material circumstantial evidence
on the question of the veracity of testimony of the witness. Prior criminal conduct,
including all prior felony convictions, is relevant evidence of such character."); 120
CONG. REC. S. 19909 (comment of Sens. Hart, Hraska, and Thurmond); supra note 66
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this proposition may point in the exact opposite direction. That is,
the argument for total exclusion of character impeachment evidence
may actually be more powerful if, as Premise 4 suggests, very anti-
social behavior-even behavior not involving dishonesty-strongly
implies probable willingness to commit peijury in one's own
defense.
In answering the key credibility question, the jury is already
assuming that the predicate to that implication is true; that is, the
question assumes hypothetically that the defendant has committed
the crime charged. Thus, if the implication is a strong one, the jury
can rely on it even absent evidence that the accused has a poor char-
acter for truthfulness; evidence will therefore be of negligible incre-
mental assistance in answering the key credibility question. That
incremental assistance will be all the more negligible if the impeach-
ment evidence is of a prior crime no more suggestive of untruthful-
ness than the one now being charged. But even in the strongest case
favoring impeachment-in which the impeachment evidence clearly
involved dishonesty, but the currently charged crime did not-the
same basic point holds, albeit less strongly: To the extent that com-
mission of one crime, including the one currently charged, tends to
suggest willingness to commit pejury in one's own behalf, any in-
cremental value of the impeachment evidence-already presumably
very slight-is diminished.
70
iii. Summary: Considering the Accused's Interest and
Compunctions Together
A simple illustration may help make the discussion of the pre-
ceding paragraphs more vivid. Evidence that the accused has an
untruthful character could substantially alter a rational jury's as-
sessment of his inclination to lie only if the jury followed a train of
thought something like the one presented at the beginning of this
Article:
(comment of Sen. McClellan). Part IV relies on Premise 4 in favoring the discretionary
use of character evidence to impeach witnesses other than criminal defendants.
70. Perhaps a defender of character impeachment evidence of criminal defendants
would argue that in fact evidence of an earlier crime has great probative value because
two crimes (counting the assumed commission of the crime being charged) tend to sug-
gest a "pattern," whereas one does not. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
The argument is not persuasive. For one thing, given high recidivism rates, the assump-
tion that a person has committed one crime suggests a high probability that he has
committed, or will commit, at least one more. Moreover, even if one criminal act does
not strongly suggest that the accused is a particularly low-compunction person, it does
drastically reduce the probability that he is a high-compunction person, and that is all
that is really needed.
1991]
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At first I thought it was very unlikely that, if Defoe committed
robbery, he would be willing to lie about it. But now that I know
he committed forgery a year before, that possibility seems sub-
stantially more likely.
The statement carries its own refutation. A jury, acting for the
moment on the assumption that the accused committed the robbery
with which he is charged, most likely will assess as very high the
probability that he would be willing to lie about the crime to save
himself. If so, that assessment will not have room to go much
higher. And it is extremely unlikely to be increased substantially by
proof that the defendant has a bad character for truthfulness or that
at some previous time the defendant committed another crime, even
a crime of dishonesty like forgery.
b. Probability of the Accused's Ability to Bring the Lie Off
The notion that a hypothetically guilty defendant will be per-
ceived as strongly inclined to lie in his self-defense does not neces-
sarily rob his testimony of probative value. The jury might be
impressed with the accused's ability to bring the story off. The jury
might say in effect, "If he were guilty, he probably wouldn't be able
to testify this way, in substance or demeanor. Therefore, the fact
that he has testified this way suggests that he is not guilty."
The guilty defendant's ability to bring off a lie depends on the
substantive plausibility of the particular lie and his ability to lie with
a persuasive demeanor. The jury's assessment of either factor is not
likely to be rationally affected by proof that the defendant has prior
convictions or has an untruthful character.
The guilty defendant who takes the stand in his own defense
not only has to lie; he has to come up with a particular lie to tell. If
he takes the stand and tells a story that appears plausible even after
cross-examination and careful analysis of all the evidence in the
case, he may provide very important assistance to his case. The
jury might say, "If he were guilty, he couldn't have come up with a
story like that, managing to avoid all the danger spots that the pros-
ecution put in his path. ' 71 On the other hand, if he twists himself
into contortions trying to explain apparent inconsistencies, he may
be worse off than before he testified, when the jury could only spec-
71. In some cases, it is not difficult to come up with a plausible lie. For, example, if
the crime is assault and the prosecution's case rests entirely on the victim's identifica-
tion of the accused, it is often easy enough for the accused to come up with a plausible
story, such as that he was home alone in bed. But for that very reason, the jury may be
inclined to.give less weight to such a story.
[Vol. 38-637
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ulate that he had no good story to tell; the jury might now think,
"This is just the type of implausible story we would expect him to
tell if he were guilty." But in either case the issue is the probability,
on the assumptions that the accused is guilty of the crime charged
and inclined to lie in his defense, that the accused would tell this
particular story. In assessing that probability, the fact that the ac-
cused was previously convicted of crime, or more generally that he
has a bad character for truthfulness, will usually have little or no
bearing.
Even if the guilty defendant is inclined to lie in his defense, and
even if he has a plausible story to tell, his testimony may not be
successful if he lacks a persuasive demeanor in lying. Conceivably,
one with a bad character for truthfulness will tend to be an exper-
ienced liar, and so better able to lie persuasively; the argument,
then, would be that prior misconduct or a general assessment of
untruthful character is useful to the jury in assessing what appears
to be a persuasive demeanor, making more likely the hypothesis
that the defendant lied without giving any outward manifestation of
dishonesty. 72 But this argument is far too shaky to support substan-
tial reliance.
For one thing, the argument would have little or no force as
applied to bad acts not involving dishonesty. Whatever bearing
such acts have on the defendant's inclination to lie, they convey
very little information about his ability as a liar.
Even as applied to proof of misconduct involving dishonesty or
of a generally untruthful character, the argument is very dubious.
It would require a juror to follow logic something like this: "I
didn't think he would be able to bring it off, but then I found that he
was an experienced liar-as evidenced by the fact that he got caught
once-so now I think that he appeared so smooth because he's got
experience, and the conviction was just a slip." Perhaps a tip-of-
the-iceberg argument is possible: "If the defendant got caught once
or twice in a bad act of dishonesty, it's probably because he com-
mits them a lot, and if he does that he probably has gotten pretty
good at it." But it takes quite a leap of faith to accept this argu-
ment. At least equally plausible, it would appear, is an argument
that the defendant's failure to cover a significant act of dishonesty
shows that he is a poor liar. In any event, it seems clear that the
72. S. SAMENOW, supra note 34, at 37 (delinquent children who will later be
criminals develop the ability to lie.). Cf 1 S. YOCHELSON & S. SAMENOW, supra note
45, at 349 ("The criminal gets away with more lies than those for which he is held
accountable.").
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defendant's prior history yields no strong generalization that he is
able to lie convincingly. The argument based on the demeanor of
the accused offers insufficient support to warrant the admission of
highly prejudicial evidence.
B. The Dynamic Effect of Character Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants
Section A assumed that the prosecution's use of character im-
peachment evidence did not alter the defendant's in-court conduct
in any way. In reality, of course, a rule allowing such evidence only
if the defendant testifies necessarily changes the defendant's incen-
tives to testify.
Some defendants who would otherwise take the stand do not
do so because they do not want to face character impeachment evi-
dence. That is a great loss, because the right to testify in one's own
defense, although of far more recent vintage than some other rights
of a criminal defendant, 73 must now be considered as one of the
most fundamental in our jurisprudence.74 Perhaps to the extent
that defendants are in fact guilty we can be complacent about pres-
suring them to forgo this right; the right to lie in one's own defense,
though presumably of some worth in giving the defendant a sense
that he has received a full hearing, does not rank high on the list of
values that our system protects. 75 But some of the defendants who
decline to take the stand because of the prospect of character im-
peachment are not in fact guilty. And in some cases that failure to
take the stand is utterly disastrous, spelling the difference between
conviction and acquittal.
The harm to the accused from failure to testify may be broken
down into two components. Take as a baseline the jury's assess-
ment, made at the conclusion of the prosecution's case, of the
probability that the accused is guilty. First, failure to testify sacri-
fices a crucial opportunity to lower that baseline assessment. Had
the accused testified he might have provided the jurors with excul-
patory information that they would receive in no other way. Or he
73. In 1859, Maine became the first state to declare the accused's competence to
testify. Bradley, Havens, Jenkins and Salvucci and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify,
18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 420 (1981) [hereinafter Bradley]. For discussions of the
development of the accused's right to testify, see id. at 420-23; see also 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 579 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
74. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 n.10 (1987).
75. Cf People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 672-73 n.6, 420 N.W.2d 499, 550-51 n.6
(1988) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (excluding impeachment by prior conviction makes it eas-
ier for a guilty defendant to present a credible defense to the jury.).
[Vol. 38:637
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might have impressed the jury with his demeanor, persuading them
that he could not have spoken so self-confidently had he been lying.
Perhaps more importantly, the accused's failure to testify af-
firmatively raises the jurors' probability assessment of guilt from the
baseline level. No matter how vigorously the court instructs the
jurors not to take into account that failure to testify, they are almost
certain to do so. This proposition is hardly novel,76 but it warrants
close examination. Jurors consider the failure to testify not merely
because they might lack the sophistication to follow the judicial in-
struction, or even because they are disposed to ignore the instruc-
tion so that they can implement their own sense of justice. Rather,
careful Bayesian analysis shows that jurors tend to disregard the
instruction because it is virtually incoherent.
The jury's decision as to whether the prosecution has proven
its version of events beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be made in
the abstract, without considering the possibility of alternative ver-
sions. To say that there is no reasonable doubt is to conclude, at the
very least, that the prosecution has proven its version to be far more
probable than any possible account-whether presented through
defense evidence or not-consistent with the defendant's innocence.
In deciding the relative probability of the "Guilty" version and a
"Not Guilty" version, the jury will rationally ask which version was
more likely to yield the evidence that has been presented in court,
and by how much.
But the rational jury cannot consider only the evidence actu-
ally presented to it. The absence of and limitations on evidence also
have significance, and may be analyzed in much the same way as
evidence itself. Suppose, for example, that a proposition disproving
a "Not Guilty" version would, if true, be provable by the prosecu-
tion, and that the prosecution would have no substantial reason for
withholding such proof. If the prosecution fails to present such
proof, the jury may infer that the proposition is not true. This is
part of a more general missing evidence principle, ,that failure to
produce evidence apparently within a party's control may warrant
an inference that the withheld evidence was unfavorable to that
76. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 6, at 609:
Jurors expect innocent defendants to respond to false criminal accusa-
tions. From silence jurors draw an inference of guilt. The defendant who
appears to withhold relevant information is likely to be viewed as guilty.
No one can reasonably expect the jury to set aside the mental presump-
tion of guilt created by the defendant's silence simply because the court
gives it instructions to do so.
See generally supra note 59.
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party. 77 A rational jury will want to apply the same principle to the
defendant: a version of the facts consistent with innocence will ap-
pear less probable if the defendant fails to testify to it, unless it ap-
pears to the jury that he would be as likely to stay off the stand if he
were innocent as if he were guilty.
Thus, the instruction not to take into account the defendant's
failure to testify poses a far greater problem for the jury than does
an instruction to put certain evidence out of mind altogether or with
respect to a given issue or set of issues. An instruction to disregard
evidence might be unrealistic enough, asking jurors to discipline
themselves by disregarding probative information. But at least its
command to the jurors is clear and coherent: "Do not use this evi-
dence in your thinking or deliberations; act as if you never heard
it." By contrast, the instruction regarding failure to testify is not
subject to any such rendering. Obviously, it cannot be deemed to
ask that the jury act as if the defendant did testify, hypothesizing
what his testimony would have been and how he would have deliv-
ered it. The only way to make sense of the instruction is to treat it
as a charge to assume that, whether innocent or guilty, the defend-
ant was equally likely to decline to testify. But, especially if the case
against the defendant appears strong, so that an innocent defendant
would be likely to testify, this assumption is contrary to the realities
of the situation, and even more contrary to the jury's understanding
of the situation. Thus, the jury can hardly help but ignore the
instruction.
Putting aside for the moment the prospect of character im-
peachment, there are, of course, substantial reasons why an inno-
cent defendant might decline to testify. Perhaps he would be an
unsympathetic witness, or so unpersuasive that he would be worse
off if the jury heard his testimony than if the jury wondered what it
would be. 7s Or perhaps the defense feels that the prosecution's case
is sufficiently weak so that it is wiser to rely on an argument
stressing the presumption of innocence than to give the prosecution
77. See Comment, Generalized Inferences, Individual Merits, and Jury Discretion,
66 B.U.L. REV. 509, 518 & n.34 (1986).
78. "Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often con-
fuse and embarrass [the defendant] to such a degree as to increase rather than remove
prejudices against him." Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1892), quoted in
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965); see also A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MAN-
UAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 390 (4th student ed. 1984).
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a chance to build its case through cross-examination. 79 But the jury
may be unaware of these or other possibilities,80 or count them
lightly. If the jury does take these arguments fully into account, it
will probably recognize that they also apply to a guilty defendant.
Indeed, whether or not the jury understands why an innocent
defendant might decline to take the stand, it will correctly under-
stand one powerful reason why a guilty defendant might: A guilty
defendant, or his lawyer, might be afraid that he would not be able
to bring the testimony off, and that by testifying to an implausible
story he would worsen his position.81 A jury will be acting ration-
ally if it recognizes-again, putting aside the possible impact of pro-
spective character impeachment-that a guilty defendant is more
likely to stay off the stand than is an innocent one. This means that
the jury is likely to regard the accused's failure to take the stand as
indicative of guilt, even if in fact it was only a means of preventing
the character impeachment.
There remains the possibility that we temporarily put aside-
that the jury understands it may have been the prospect of character
impeachment that kept the accused off the stand. In fact that possi-
79. See Glaberson, The 'Wrong'Court?, N.Y. Times, Jul. 3, 1990, at B3, col. 5 (No
witnesses called in defense of Imelda Marcos; "[i]nstead of fighting the prosecution's
case, [counsel] seemed sometimes to be riding it, letting the weaknesses of the case ex-
pose themselves.").
80. Attacks on the defendant's character are not the only form of impeachment
evidence that may dissuade the accused from taking the stand. He may, for example,
fear impeachment by evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible under the exclu-
sionary rule because it was illegally obtained. A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 78, at
§ 390(H); see United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). He may also fear impeachment by a statement that he
made without receiving proper Miranda warnings. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225-26 (1971). Further, although his testimony at a hearing to suppress evidence
would not be admissible if he does not testify, it might be if he does. See United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93-94, (1980); id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
the Court has given "broad hints" that it will so decide). Finally, the defendant might
fear that the prosecution might have evidence that, although not favorable to its case-in-
chief, would so impeach the defendant's exculpatory story that he would be worse off
than if he had not testified at all; this might be the case, for example, if the defendant
previously gave an alibi inconsistent with the one to which he is prepared to testify.
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980); cf Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
240 (1980) (impeachment by proof of silence before Miranda warnings); Bradley, supra
note 73, 435-36; see also, A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 78, at § 390(G).
81. There are other conceivable explanations as well that would account for the
failure of a guilty defendant, but not an innocent defendant, to take the stand. First, the
defendant might have been unwilling on moral grounds to lie in his own defense; for the
reasons stated in section A, this usually appears rather improbable. Second, if his law-
yer recognized that if he took the stand he would perjure himself, she might refuse to
put him on.
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bility appears rather slim; most jurors probably do not have enough
familiarity with the law of evidence to know that often an accused
who decides to testify pays a penalty by opening the door to charac-
ter impeachment. To the extent that jurors do recognize this propo-
sition, the impeachment rule works great havoc. It means that any
time a defendant stays off the stand and substantial evidence of an
unsavory past is not admitted for another purpose, the knowing ju-
ror will suspect that it was the prospect of character impeachment
that kept him off. There is no good use to which the juror can put
that information; she cannot use the information to evaluate the
credibility of a person who did not testify. 2 The only use to which
she can put the suspicion is a prejudicial one, by assuming that the
defendant was likely to act in accordance with his inferred evil
propensities.8 3 Thus, an advocate of allowing character impeach-
ment of criminal defendants had best assume that jurors are una-
ware of the rule.
C. Three Spurious Defenses of the Rule
Section A of this Part showed that character impeachment evi-
dence of an accused has substantial prejudicial impact, but virtually
no probative value. Section B showed that by declining to take the
stand-the only way an accused who is subject to character im-
peachment may avoid that evidence-the accused acts in a way that
a jury will tend rationally to associate strongly with guilt.
An advocate of the rule allowing some character impeachment
evidence of an accused might accept all these conclusions, but still
refuse to yield. This section will raise and dispute three arguments
that such an advocate might make even after conceding that charac-
ter impeachment evidence offers little new information about an ac-
cused's willingness or ability to lie in his own defense. Advocates of
the rule rarely, if ever, make these arguments explicitly. They are
presented here in part to make a "due diligence" search for possible
justifications for the rule. Moreover, at least some of these argu-
82. The accused may be subject to impeachment even without taking the stand if
under an exception to the hearsay rule he offers his own prior declarations. See FED. R.
EvID. 806. But in that case, the impeachment evidence would be admitted openly;
there would be no occasion for the knowing juror to speculate surreptitiously on its
existence and significance.
83. If the defendant does testify, the knowing juror might draw the corresponding
inference that the defendant had an exemplary past and therefore was unlikely to com-
mit the crime being tried. This inference is also improper, absent the defendant's deci-
sion to place his character in issue and give the prosecution a chance to respond.
Cf FED. R. EvID 404(a)(1).
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ments probably underlie the rule implicitly; they may largely ac-
count for the tenacity it has exhibited, notwithstanding its lack of
logical force.
1. The Probability of Guilt
The advocate might first argue that, at least with respect to
impeachment by prior convictions or serious misconduct suggesting
an untruthful character, very few criminal defendants who are sub-
ject to character impeachment are in fact innocent. The rule there-
fore only very rarely does harm, but it often does good by inducing
many guilty defendants to stay off the stand, where they would
commit perjury. When a guilty defendant takes the stand, the pre-
judicial impact of the impeachment evidence is arguably beneficial
because it leads the jury to the right result, albeit for the wrong
reasons.
This argument cannot be dismissed out of hand by a mere in-
vocation of the presumption of innocence. Suppose, for example,
we were convinced that only once out of the last ten years had a
defendant subject to impeachment by prior convictions or serious
misconduct actually been innocent. We might then be persuaded
that the losses created by the rule are minuscule and well worth the
benefits of keeping thousands of perjuring guilty defendants off the
stand.
The argument would be valid, however, only if the proportion
of defendants subject to such impeachment who are in fact guilty is
not only merely high, but really quite sincerely high, much higher
than the proportion of all defendants who are guilty. Assume, as
may well be the case, that most defendants whose cases actually go
to trial are guilty.8 4 Nevertheless, we would not accept a rule that
barred an accused from testifying on the ground that he is probably
guilty and so his testimony would probably be perjured. A more
modest rule, burdening the decision to testify (say, by opening the
door to otherwise inadmissible, irrelevant but highly prejudicial evi-
dence), would presumably fare no better. But that more modest
rule exactly describes the doctrine allowing impeachment by con-
victions or prior misconduct. Burdening the accused's ability to
84. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 669, 420 N.W.2d 499, 549 (1988)
(Boyle, J., dissenting) ("[T]he safeguards in the system assure us of that which every
trial judge and lawyer knows, that 'the preponderant majority' of defendants are guilty
of the charged offense or a lesser or related offense.' ") (quoting in part Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975)).
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present his case 'cannot be justified merely on the ground that most
defendants are guilty.
Can we, then, have confidence that defendants who have com-
mitted, or been convicted for, serious misconduct are far more
likely than other defendants to be guilty? It appears not. We may
concede readily that a person who has committed bad acts in the
past is more likely to commit a given crime; propensity theories do,
after all, have a good deal of force. But this does not tell us
whether, of persons who are accused of crime (and whose cases go
to trial), the proportion of false accusations is lower among those
who are subject to impeachment based on their prior history than
among those who are not. In fact, because investigation of crimes
must often begin by focusing on those "usual suspects" already
known to law enforcement officials, it may well be that a defendant
with a prior record is more likely than one without a record to have
been falsely accused.85 Cases in which a person with a shady past is
tried for a crime he did not commit are not all that rare.8 6 We
should not make the mistake of thinking that the force of the char-
85. For a careful analysis, see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 216-18 (2d ed. 1982). It is even conceivable that a conviction-
hungry prosecutor would tend more readily to bring a weak case against a person with a
prior record because the character impeachment rule would make it harder for such a
defendant to defend himself.
Here are two pieces of anecdotal evidence to support the vulnerability of prior
convicts to prosecution. Paul Carrington has told me of a case in which he sat as a juror
and in which the prosecution presented strong police testimony that the defendant had
begun an altercation at home. In retrospect, Carrington wonders whether the defend-
ant's long prior record accounts for the police's supposed presence in the defendant's
living room.
The second story arises from a case I handled on appeal. The defendant was ac-
cused of robbing two gold chains from a man observing a three-card monte game near
Times Square in New York City. I am persuaded that, in fact, the defendant was the
dealer, and that the supposed victim had really bet and lost his chains and claimed theft
only when the police arrived on the scene and he realized he might have a chance to
recover his property. The defendant did not take the stand-apparently for fear that his
numerous convictions (almost all of which were for gambling) would be held against
him. He did present his version of the facts through another witness, but she probably
ruined his chances of acquittal. She denied knowing him, but the prosecution presented
strong evidence that she was in fact his common law wife. The defendant would have
been better served if he had testified himself, admitted readily to all of his prior convic-
tions, and then argued that the Times Square police were tired of arresting him for
small gambling offenses and eager to have him convicted of a felony. (The defendant
eventually escaped from prison, forfeiting the appeal.).
86. See Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 395, 416 (1987) ("In some of these cases [in which a person was misiden-
tified as the perpetrator of a crime] the suspect would not have been identified but for
some fact that made him an object of attentioni, typically the fact that he had been
arrested or convicted of a crime."); see also supra note 85.
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acter impeachment rule is felt almost exclusively by guilty
defendants.
2. Differential Impact on the Innocent and the Guilty
The first argument assumed that innocent defendants are less
likely than guilty ones to be subject to character impeachment. The
second argument focuses on defendants who are subject to such evi-
dence, and assumes as a predicate that guilty ones are far more
likely than innocent ones to stay off the stand because of the pros-
pect of the impeachment. If this is true, and if staying off the stand
tends rationally to suggest guilt,8 7 then the rule helps to sort out
guilty defendants from the innocent.
This argument might have some logical force if the predicate
were true, but that proposition is dubious at best. It is by no means
clear that a guilty defendant subject to character impeachment is at
all more likely than an innocent one to stay off the stand because of
the rule. Guilty defendants in general are more likely to stay off the
stand than innocent ones, but that is beside the present point:
whether a guilty defendant who otherwise would have testified is
more likely than an innocent one to be dissuaded by the rule from
doing so is unclear.
In any event, whatever "sorting out" benefits the rule might
have under this argument come at a frightful price. If an innocent
defendant stays off the stand because of the rule, he taints himself
by acting in a manner that, as the argument acknowledges, suggests
guilt. And if he testifies, he exposes himself to the prejudicial im-
pact of the character evidence.
Beyond this, there is a terrible irony to the "sorting out" argu-
ment: to the extent that fear of character impeachment keeps guilty
defendants off the stand more than innocent ones, when character
impeachment evidence is presented it suggests innocence rather
than guilt.88 Perhaps defense counsel could take advantage of this
irony: "Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Defoe took the stand to testify
87. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
88. This might not hold true if there is a very high correlation between guilt'of the
crime charged and exposure to character impeachment evidence. Suppose, for example,
notwithstanding the doubts raised in the previous subsection, that the overwhelming
majority of innocent defendants are not subject to character impeachment evidence and
that the great majority of guilty defendants are. It might then be possible that, even if
the sorting out effect is strong-that is, even if the threat of character impeachment
tends to keep the guilty off the stand more than the innocent-the proportion of guilt
will be higher among those defendants who testify and are impeached by character
evidence than among those who testify and are not so impeached. But that first propor-
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even though he knew that if he did so the prosecutor would throw
his entire criminal record in his face, and in yours." But defense
counsel would rather not have the opportunity to make such an
argument.
3. Neutralizing the Benefits of the Accused's Testimony
The two arguments just considered are based on benefits per-
ceived in keeping defendants off the stand. The final argument that
one advocating character impeachment of criminal defendants
might make is focused on the consequences if the accused does tes-
tify. A defendant who presents himself in the best possible light on
the witness stand, who looks respectable and sounds gentle, gains
two important advantages, even apart from the persuasive force of
his testimony. Character impeachment can neutralize both these
benefits.
First, the accused essentially may be asking the jury to believe
that he is not the type of person who would likely have committed
the crime charged. Thus, the advocate might argue, character im-
peachment assists in determining the bottom line-not whether in
court the accused lied from the witness stand, but whether out of
court he acted criminally as charged. Presumably the impeachment
evidence would not have been admissible for this purpose had the
accused not taken the stand, because if it would have been, there
would be no need to resort to the character impeachment rule. But,
the argument runs, by taking the stand himself the accused has
placed his character in issue89 as effectively as if he had put a char-
acter witness on the stand to testify to his law-abiding nature. Had
he done that, the prosecutor would have been allowed to cross-ex-
amine evidence to the contrary. Thus, the argument concludes, a
similar remedy is appropriate when the accused is, in effect, his own
character witness.
Second, if an accused has a sympathetic demeanor on the wit-
ness stand, the jurors may not only conclude that he was unlikely to
have committed the crime; they may also find it harder to condemn
him to criminal punishment, and so they may effectively raise the
prosecution's burden of proof. The defendant who testifies person-
tion may well still be lower than the proportion of guilt among all defendants, or among
all defendants who would have testified but for the character impeachment.
89. The phrase "character in issue" is used here in the loose sense, meaning that
character is a subject of litigation, rather than in the strict sense in which character is
"an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense." FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
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alizes himself by talking to the jurors.9° No longer is he a mysteri-
ous, incomplete figure; now he has a voice, and with it he has made
a connection with the jurors. They know him and may have some
human sympathy for him. Character impeachment, the advocate
might argue, can nullify that sympathy, lowering the burden of
proof to the proper level.
There may be some force to these fears. But the defendant has
persuasive responses. First, although the defendant had a right to
introduce evidence bearing on his character, 91 he chose not to do so.
By making that choice, he relied on the rule that the defendant's
character is an issue in the case only if he decides to make it one.
At the same time, the defendant invoked his right to testify. He did
not intend, by doing so, to waive his right to prevent his character
from being an issue. Given that he testified, he had to testify with
some demeanor, and naturally he did his best; it would not make
sense to hold that the testifying defendant could prevent his charac-
ter from being placed in issue only by mumbling and shifting his
eyes, or by trying to appear so bland that his demeanor would have
no effect on the jury.
A similar argument responds to fear of jury sympathy. A de-
fendant ought to be able to take the stand without automatically
being deemed to have effectively made a plea for mercy. Moreover,
extreme caution is necessary here; as the interests supporting the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard suggest, the system should
expect, and be willing to tolerate, far more errors in favor of than
against the defendant.92 Thus, a court should make fine-tuned in-
terventions on the prosecution's behalf only, if at all, when neces-
sary to correct a very strong pro-defendant distortion by the jury.
Such a distortion does not seem probable here. Perhaps the sympa-
thy that jurors feel with a defendant who has connected personally
with them does cause them effectively to raise the prosecution's bur-
90. Cf Kadish & Brofman, Trial Strategy and Tactics in I CRIMINAL DEFENSE
TECHNIQUES 1A.07 (R. Cipes ed. 1989):
§ 1A.07 HUMANIZING THE DEFENDANT
With regard to the defendant himself, it is extremely important that
he be portrayed as a human being who has the same attributes and frail-
ties of the jurors. Utilize every opportunity to overcome the psychologi-
cal edge of dislike (caused by the mere fact that the defendant is charged
with a crime) the jury is likely to feel toward the defendant ....
It seems increasingly important in criminal cases to have the client
testify.
91. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
92. See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968).
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den of proof, but whether it is raised to an excessive level is hard to
say.93 A fortiori, it is difficult to determine with any confidence that
this sympathy-affected burden is significantly further from the ideal
than is the insufficient burden that a juror might impose on the
prosecution when the defendant has not established a communica-
tive link with her. And even if testimony by the accused does dis-
tort the burden of proof in favor of the defendant, the "cure" of
allowing character impeachment evidence would very often be ex-
cessive, because learning a history of bad acts will likely cause the
jury to lower the burden of persuasion very significantly.9 4 In any
event, criminal penalties are more acceptable if they are imposed in
a system that comports with ideals of human dignity and, by leav-
ing room for consideration of the defendant's human quality, mini-
mizes room for doubt when he is found guilty.
It may be that no rule is ideal. The first alternative-allowing
a defendant to take the stand without opening the door to character
impeachment-may indeed give him gratuitous benefits, both by
leading the jury to believe that his character makes him unlikely to
have committed the crime and by raising the effective burden of
persuasion. But the second alternative requires the defendant, in
effect, to elect between the right to testify and the right to prevent
the jury from using propensity evidence. The first alternative is
clearly preferable.
The situation would be far different, of course, if we took a
more hospitable attitude towards propensity evidence on the merits.
And in truth, such an attitude might account for a good deal of the
93. The question of the extent to which it is appropriate for jurors to give weight to
their sympathy for the accused has recently gained substantial judicial attention. See,
e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (instruction at penalty phase of trial
not to be swayed by, inter alia, "mere sympathy" held constitutionally acceptable as
construed to be "a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally
divorced from the evidence adduced during" that phase); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (improper to "exclude[ ] from considera-
tion in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or miti-
gating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."); State v. Hunt, 115
N.J. 330, 401, 558 A.2d 1259, 1295-96 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting) ("Notions of
jury nullification are appropriately implicated in our recognition that a jury in a capital-
murder prosecution may indeed be allowed to consider sympathy for the defendant.");
State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 297, 524 A.2d 188, 276 (1987) (no constitutional viola-
tion because, "[a]s in California v. Brown, the instructions here did not preclude the jury
from considering all possible mitigating circumstances and such sympathy as those cir-
cumstances might inspire.") (citation omitted)).
94. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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heartiness of the character impeachment rule.95 Some courts have
made rather glaring end runs around the general ban on propensity
evidence, exercising specious creativity in their efforts to find some
other theory on which bad-act evidence might be admitted.
96
Courts' receptivity to character impeachment evidence may simi-
larly reflect another way around the propensity ban.
The propensity ban is not too restrictive. But if it were, the
proper response would be to ease the ban candidly, widening the
very narrow circumstances in which, irrespective of whether the de-
fendant testifies, bad-act evidence currently may be admitted on a
propensity theory.97 The Department of Justice would take this ap-
proach to an extreme, allowing the "uniform admission" of defend-
ants' prior convictions. 98 The Department recognizes that the
proper response is not to penalize any defendant who has previously
committed acts suggesting dishonesty for exercising his right to tes-
tify.99 Even assuming that it is beneficial, not harmful, for the jury
to consider propensity evidence in determining guilt, character im-
peachment evidence offers only part of the benefit: such evidence
comes in only if the defendant takes the stand, and in some cases it
may bear only tenuously on the defendant's propensity to commit
the particular crime alleged. And allowing character impeachment
works mischief by inducing defendants to stay off the stand.
95. Note, for example, the revealing language used by Justice Boyle, dissenting in
People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988), from the creation of a bright
line rule that excludes much prior conviction evidence, and complaining that the rule
would, for example, categorically prevent an accused drug seller from
being impeached with evidence of prior convictions of the sale of drugs,
and a defendant accused of sexual offenses from being impeached with
prior convictions of sexual offenses. As a result, the majority's limitation
of trial -judge discretion will multiply the opportunity for even the guilty
defendant to escape punishment and make the discovery of truth more
difficult.
Id. at 660, 420 N.W.2d at 545.
96. See supra note 13.
97. In some cases, in which the pattern of activity (most often a particular type of
sex crime) is highly unusual and can be very narrowly defined, courts have admitted the
evidence on what appears to be a straight propensity theory. See, e.g., State v. McFar-
lin, 110 Ariz. 225, 517 P.2d 87 (1973); State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798
(1956); Brackens v. State, 480 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1985); contra, Commonwealth v.
Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 424 A.2d 1257 (1981).
98. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SERIES, REPORT No. 4, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE ADMIS-
SION OF CRIMINAL HISTORIES AT TRIAL (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
707, 710 (1989).
99. Id. at 741.
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D. A Summary and a Possible Corollary: Implications for the
Criminal Defendant as Witness
The conclusion thus far is simple: Character impeachment evi-
dence of an accused has, virtually no probative value with respect to
credibility, but its availability has tremendous prejudicial impact.
Its use encourages the jury to implement a propensity theory that
the law refuses to accept, and the mere threat of its use inhibits
criminal defendants from exercising their right to testify. There-
fore, such impeachment of an accused should not be allowed. 0 0°
If the simple prohibition proposed here were adopted, another
change, one in favor of the prosecution, might be appropriate. So
long as the law more readily allows use of prior convictions against
an accused if he takes the stand than if he does not, the rule of
Griffin v. California 10 1-that a prosecutor is constitutionally barred
from commenting on the accused's failure to testify-seems almost
inevitable. It is not acceptable to allow a prosecutor to encourage a
jury to think that the accused stayed off the stand because he could
not give credible exculpatory evidence when, in fact, the defendant
was intimidated from testifying by the threat that doing so would
open up his prior criminal record or otherwise expose him to char-
acter impeachment. 0 2 If that intimidating factor were removed,
the situation would be far different.
Absent the threat of character impeachment, some defendants
would still decline to take the stand, but most often only out of fear
of providing evidence, in substance or demeanor, that the jury
might reasonably and legitimately regard as supporting the prosecu-
1 100. At most, admissibility should be allowed only on a showing of extraordinary
circumstances that, notwithstanding the arguments presented here, render the evidence
highly probative with respect to the defendant's credibility. Conceivably, there are
some circumstances in which the probative value outweighs the prejudice; if so, they
must be extremely rare, not frequent enough or important enough to justify muddying
up the law.
101. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
102. Id. at 615. Perhaps the rule of Griffin could be limited to situations in which
the defendant actually had prior convictions, but that would tip off knowledgeable ju-
rors, who would know that, when the prosecutor did not comment on the defendant's
failure to testify, the defendant almost certainly had prior convictions. Moreover, this
modified rule would give defendants with prior convictions an advantage, the ability to
stay off the stand without fear of prosecutorial comment, that a defendant without a
record would not have. Finally, limiting the rule in this way would not take care of the
situation in which the defendant, while not having prior convictions, was still intimi-
dated from taking the stand by fear of other forms of character impeachment; the alter-
native of applying the rule only if the defendant had some form of character
impeachment evidence to fear would probably either be very vague or virtually restore
the full Griffin rule.
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tion's case. 10 3 The defendant's failure to take the stand would
therefore be an example of the common case in which a party's fail-
ure to present a given type of evidence in itself has probative value,
and so may legitimately give rise to an argument by the opposition
and an adverse inference by the jury.l °4 Indeed, even given the cur-
rent character impeachment rules, juries seem to draw the inference
frequently; 10 5 if the defendant requests, the jury must be instructed
not to do so, 10 6 but courts do not have any effective method of en-
forcement. 107 Barring character impeachment evidence of defend-
ants may not nullify all the reasons supporting the Griffin rule,108
103. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. For example, the accused may
fear that his demeanor would be unpersuasive or unsympathetic, or that testifying
would expose him to cross-examination by an inconsistent prior alibi; if so, the jury's
consideration of these types of demeanor evidence in evaluating his testimony would be
perfectly proper.
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 76 and following text.
106. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981); cf Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
U.S. 333, 339-41 (1978) (giving of instruction held not to violate privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination notwithstanding defendant's objection).
107. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) ("What the jury may infer,
given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes
the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another."); United States v.
Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (construes
prosecutorial comment as improperly relating to defendant's failure to testify, but ac-
knowledges: "[Flor the most part.., jurors are free to draw whatever conclusions they
will from the defendant's silence, and the defendant has no means to know what conclu-
sions jurors have reached, or to challenge them."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985);
Stout v. United States, 227 F. 799, 804 (8th Cir. 1915) (refusing to allow verdict to be
impeached by juror's testimony that jury discussed defendant's failure to testify), cert.
denied, 241 U.S. 664 (1916).
108. The Griffin Court based its result largely on the proposition that "comment on
the refusal to testify ... is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 380 U.S. at 614.
But any persuasive prosecution evidence or argument makes it costly to refuse to testify.
See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 700 (1968) (criticizing Griffin: "presenting an unpleasant
consequence is not compulsion unless the unpleasantness is so great as in effect to de-
prive of choice"). That the accused has a constitutional right not to testify does not
necessarily mean (though it might, depending on the nature of the right) that he is
entitled to be insulated from the consequences of exercising his option.
Another argument for the Griffin rule that would survive the abolition of character
impeachment of the criminal defendant is that sometimes an accused declines to take
the stand because doing so opens him up to impeachment by improperly obtained evi-
dence that the jurors might, notwithstanding an instruction, use on the merits. See
supra note 80. The argument against allowing prosecutorial comment is much stronger
in such cases than when the accused stays off the stand for fear of legitimately obtained
evidence that might hurt his position. See supra note 103. Cases involving improperly
obtained evidence do not, however, provide much support for retaining the Griffin rule
in the vast majority of cases, which do not fit this mold.
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but it would, surely make prosecutorial comment on the failure to
testify far more palatable.
Ironically, the Department of Justice also argues that removal
of the disincentive to testify created by the character impeachment
rules would make it easier to overrule Griffin, I° 9 a result much de-
sired by the Department.l10 The Justice Department would remove
most of that incentive by making the defendant's prior convictions
admissible even if he does not testify."I' This Article favors a move
in the opposite direction. It accepts the general rule barring pro-
pensity evidence offered against an accused, and, given that rule,
has argued that character impeachment of an accused should be
eliminated. If a consequence of that change is to cut down the main
rationale underlying Griffin, so be it.
IV. OTHER WITNESSES-AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Part III examined the case of the criminal defendant who testi-
fies in his own defense. The case is vastly different when anyone
else is the witness against whom character impeachment evidence is
offered; the full extent of the difference depends on the circum-
stances of the particular case. The analysis presented here starts
with a hypothetical near the opposite pole from that of the criminal
defendant on the stand.
Suppose that Wendy Whitney was a passenger in a car driven
by her wealthy neighbor Dollar when Dollar got into an accident
with Poor. Poor is now suing Dollar. Whitney has testified for
Dollar that Poor was contributorily negligent. Poor now wants to
impeach with proof of Whitney's prior conviction for petty larceny.
Whitney's credibility with respect to the proposition that the
plaintiff was negligent is in dispute. Recall from Part III that the
credibility of a witness with respect to a particular proposition de-
pends on the ratio between two probabilities: The probability that
the witness would give this testimony if it were true, and the
probability that the witness would give this testimony if it were not
true. 112 In attempting to undercut Whitney's credibility with re-
spect to Poor's negligence, Poor is arguing, in essence, that this ra-
109. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SERIES, REPORT No. 8, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON ADVERSE
INFERENCES FROM SILENCE (1989), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1005, at
1082-86 (1989).
110. Id. at 1013.
111. See id. at 1084; supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text following note 58.
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tio is no more, or hardly any more, than one. In, other words,
Whitney would be no more likely, or hardly more likely, to testify
to Poor's negligence if it were true than if it were false. This argu-
ment might be broken down into two parts, one attempting to mini-
mize the first probability and the other, more important, one
attempting to maximize the second. Whitney's general character
for truthfulness might have substantial relevance to each of these
arguments.
First, Poor might want to argue that Whitney would not neces-
sarily testify to Poor's negligence if it were true. If Whitney is a
pathological liar, then she might have been unwilling to testify that
Poor was negligent even though that were true. This argument
might be counterproductive, however. Whitney might be unlikely
to lie in favor of Poor unless she had some interest, such as jealousy
of Dollar, pushing her in that direction; emphasizing that possibility
might undercut Poor's second, and more important, argument.
The second argument is that Whitney might very plausibly tes-
tify that Poor was negligent even though Poor was not. Important
to this argument, perhaps even essential to it, is a showing that
Whitney has some interest, perhaps a desire to ingratiate herself
with her wealthy neighbor, encouraging her to lie in favor of Dol-
lar. 11 3 Poor can strengthen the argument by showing that Whitney
has a poor character for truthfulness, making her more willing than
other people to favor her personal interest over her obligation to tell
the truth. If significant antisocial behavior suggests a willingness to
override that obligation, the proof of such behavior will have sub-
stantial probative value.
Two important factors make the probative value of this evi-
dence greater here than in the case of criminal defendant Defoe.
First, the interest that potentially would encourage the witness to
give this testimony even though it were untrue is much weaker in
Whitney's case than in Defoe's. As argued in Part III, many peo-
ple, probably most, would lie to save themselves from criminal lia-
bility. In contending that Defoe is not one of those relatively few
113. If Whitney had no affiliation with Dollar or other interest in lying for Dollar,
then the importance of the character evidence would probably be small: even if Poor
could show that Whitney had a poor character for truthfulness, that would avail Poor
little absent some suggestion of why Whitney might tell this particular lie. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-40 (suggesting that the gap in willingness to tell a lie be-
tween upright people and people of untruthful character may be small when self-interest
is negligible, may widen when self-interest is moderate, and may narrow again when
self-interest is very high). Thus, the value of character impeachment evidence may be
smallest when the witness has at stake either all or nothing at all.
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people with so pristine a character that they would resist this temp-
tation, it is overkill to show that he is one of those relatively few
with a particularly poor character for truthfulness.1 14 In Whitney's
case, by contrast, her interest in lying in Dollar's favor does not
appear so strong that most people in her position would perjure
themselves. As suggested by Premise 3, the gap between different
people's willingness to lie depends in large part on the magnitude of
the interest at stake; 1 5 the gap will be narrow if there is no interest
(or an overpowering one) at stake, and greater if the interest lies in
an intermediate range. Because Whitney's case is an intermediate
one, or at least one not at the overpowering end of the situational
spectrum, it therefore may be critical to show that Whitney's char-
acter for truthfulness is at the weak end of the personal spectrum,
suggesting that she is particularly vulnerable to temptation.
Second, although in each case the critical question is structur-
ally the same-how likely is it that the witness would give this testi-
mony even if it were false-the premise of the question in Defoe's
case has a crucial implication that is absent in Whitney's. Recall
that in Defoe's case, the premise that the testimony is false implies
that Defoe has committed the crime charged in this case. In an-
swering the key credibility question, Defoe's jurors do not view him
as an unblemished character; they hypothetically assume that he is
a criminal. In Whitney's case, though, the jurors do not make that
assumption. Instead, the critical credibility question is: "Assuming
hypothetically that Poor was not contributorily negligent, how
likely is it that Whitney would nevertheless testify that he was?" In
this case, the hypothetical premise of the question-that Poor was
not in fact negligent-has nothing whatever to do with Whitney,
and in particular suggests no wrongdoing by Whitney. Character
impeachment evidence therefore would have substantial probative
value, by informing the jurors of a weakness in Whitney's character
that they would otherwise have no basis to assume in making the
key credibility evaluation.
Not only does the character impeachment evidence have more
probative value in Whitney's case than in Defoe's, but it also poses a
far less significant threat of prejudice. Recall the two aspects of
prejudice: (a) bias against the person, leading the jury in effect to
alter the burden of persuasion in an attempt to mete out punish-
ment for past misdeeds, or at least in tolerance of such further pun-
114. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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ishment, and (b) the possibility that the jury will overvalue the
significance of the past conduct. 116 Both concerns are significant in
Defoe's case; neither is nearly as significant in Whitney's.
As to bias, if the jurors learn of Whitney's former conviction,
they will probably not be inclined to punish her, because there is no
charge that she has done anything wrong in the present case. And
even if the jurors wanted to punish her, they would not be able to,
for the simple reason that she is not a party to the case.' 17 As to the
threat of overevaluation, unlike the situation with Defoe, the only
material conduct of Whitney is her conduct in testifying from the
witness stand. Thus, unlike the criminal case, there is no danger
that in attempting to reconstruct the historical events the jury will
improperly use character impeachment evidence and will overrate
its bearing on the likely conduct of one of the actors in those events.
Any evidence is subject to jury overevaluation, and perhaps the jury
will overevaluate the significance of this evidence with respect to
Whitney's conduct on the witness stand. But the potential preju-
dice goes no further.
Moreover, even to the extent that the character impeachment
evidence does pose a threat of prejudice, the potential harm is prob-
ably not as great as in the criminal case. Dollar can preclude the
impeachment by keeping Whitney off the stand. However crucial
her testimony might be to Dollar's case, the jury will usually not
expect it as strongly as it does the testimony of a criminal defendant
who is sitting in the courtroom throughout the trial. Thus, the ab-
sence of her testimony will probably not be as deflating to Dollar's
case as Defoe's failure to testify in his own behalf is to his. Finally,
even if the prejudice leads to an incorrect outcome, either by caus-
ing the jury to overevaluate the taint on Whitney's credibility or by
inducing Dollar to keep Whitney off the stand, the loss is not as
troubling as the wrongful conviction of an innocent criminal
defendant.
Whitney's case and Defoe's are virtually polar opposites, far
different in many material respects. Whitney's is a particularly
strong one for admitting proof of previous misconduct suggesting
116. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 59.
117. Conceivably the jury might attempt to punish Whitney by finding against Dol-
lar, the party for whom she testified. But at best that is likely to be a crude and attenu-
ated form of punishment. Indeed, even if Whitney is a very biased witness, it might be
no punishment at all. Whitney's interest may be in appearing supportive of Dollar,
rather than in the outcome of the case. If so, a finding against Dollar would not trouble
Whitney at all.
1991]
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that the witness is willing, for even modest personal interests, to lie
under oath. A review of the material differences between the two
cases will help show the factors that a court should consider in de-
ciding whether to admit evidence of a witness's prior bad acts.
(A) In Whitney's case, unlike Defoe's, the witness being im-
peached is not a party and, moreover, does not have a strong affilia-
tion with a party. Thus, the jury would be much less inclined in
Whitney's case to assume, absent impeachment evidence, that the
witness would be disposed to lie under oath. 1 8 Therefore, charac-
ter impeachment evidence suggesting that the witness might actu-
ally be willing to perjure herself for even slight personal benefit has
greater potential probative value in Whitney's case. Moreover, if
the anticipation of such impeachment keeps Whitney off the stand,
that is not as great a loss as if a party, especially a criminal defend-
ant, is inhibited from testifying.
(B) In Whitney's case, unlike Defoe's, the witness's testimony is
not offered to deny a charge that her own conduct was wrongful.
Thus, in assessing the probability that is crucial to judging the wit-
ness's credibility-the probability that the witness would testify as
she has if the truth were otherwise-the jury does not assume hypo-
thetically that she has committed wrongdoing, specifically a wrong
charged in this case. Absent the character impeachment evidence,
the critical credibility question would be decided by Defoe's jury on
the assumptions that Defoe has committed a crime before taking
the witness stand, but by Dollar's jury on the assumption that
Whitney has not. Consequently, in Whitney's case, unlike in De-
foe's, proof of prior misconduct will not be cumulative in answering
that question.
(C) In Whitney's case, unlike Defoe's, how the witness acted,
and in particular whether she acted wrongfully, before taking the wit-
ness stand is not at issue at all. Thus, Whitney's case does not pres-
ent an opportunity for prejudice of the type in which the jury uses
prior misconduct for a forbidden purpose, to assess a person's pro-
pensity to act wrongfully in a substantive (that is, non-testimonial)
manner.
118. Interestingly, until well into the 19th century the common law rendered incom-
petent the testimony of parties to a lawsuit and of all persons having a direct pecuniary
or proprietary interest in the outcome; the justification was to prevent self-interested
perjury. The dead man statutes that still apply in some states are a remnant of this old
rule. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 159 (E. Cleary lawyer's ed. 3d ed.
1984 & Supp. 1987). And, as mentioned above, see supra note 63, modem continental
systems still generally refuse to put the criminal defendant on oath.
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(D) In Whitney's case, unlike Defoe's, the party who put the
witness now being impeached on the stand is not a criminal defend-
ant. Thus, the potential harm that character impeachment evidence
could do is much less in Whitney's case than in Defoe's.
(E) In Whitney's case, unlike Defoe's, the nature of the previ-
ous crimes differs. Here the difference cuts the other way: Defoe's
prior crime is more strongly indicative of dishonesty than
Whitney's. This factor should be considered in deciding whether to
admit the testimony of a witness other than a criminal defendant;
some misdeeds are more indicative of readiness to lie than are
others. If Premise 4 is correct, though, even a crime such as lar-
ceny, which does not necessarily involve dishonesty, may be useful
in certain circumstances in evaluating the witness's inclination to
tell the truth.
The hypotheticals have been set up in this way, with Defoe's
prior crime more strongly indicative of dishonesty than Whitney's,
to show that this factor should not be overemphasized. When a
criminal defendant takes the witness stand, all of the first four fac-
tors always or virtually always count against admissibility of the
character impeachment evidence-so heavily, in the aggregate, as
to justify a per se rule of exclusion. If the witness is anyone else, a
strong pro-admissibility score on the first four factors might be suffi-
cient even if the prior crime has a less clear bearing on credibility.
Each of these five factors can vary in a particular case, and may be
present in a wide variety of combinations. Consider the following
series of variations on Poor v. Dollar.
(1) Alter the case only by hypothesizing that Whitney is the
owner of the car Dollar was driving and is herself a defendant in the
action. For several reasons, this raises the harmful potential of the
character impeachment evidence. If Whitney testifies, the character
impeachment may prejudice the jury against her; in contrast to
other witnesses, parties are subject to punishment by the jury. If
Whitney does not testify, the jury will be more likely to draw an
adverse inference than it would if a nonparty potential witness
failed to testify. And, like many parties, Whitney may be her most
valuable witness; forgoing her own testimony would be a particu-
larly large loss.
Furthermore, the fact that Whitney is a party may diminish
the value of the character impeachment evidence significantly, be-
cause her interest is so obvious. It does not necessarily nullify that
value altogether, however. Whitney's interest is probably not as
powerful and obvious as that of the criminal defendant; presumably
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most people are less likely to be willing to perjure themselves to
gain a civil victory than to save themselves from criminal punish-
ment. Thus, this may still be a case in the intermediate range, and
character impeachment evidence may yield some valuable informa-
tion in attempting to assess Whitney's willingness to lie on her own
behalf. 119
(2) Now alter the original Dollar case by changing just one
other fact instead: Rather than being a purely passive witness,
Whitney may also have been a participant in the events. Suppose
that Poor is contending that Whitney encouraged Dollar to drive at
an excessive speed. Would Whitney's prior conviction then pose
sufficient prejudicial potential to justify its exclusion because it
might unduly affect the jury's assessment of the likelihood that she
was acting recklessly in the event in question? Probably it would
not, though the case could plausibly be argued either way.
(3) Next, ratchet hypothetical (2) up one more notch by sup-
posing that Dollar, rather than being involved in a civil suit, is on
trial for criminal negligence. This does not raise the prejudicial po-
tential so much as it raises our concern about the danger of that
potential. Is the effect enough to exclude proof of Whitney's prior
conviction? Again, the case is arguable either way. If, on the other
hand, Whitney were a witness for the prosecution, we would proba-
bly have less concern about the prejudicial potential of the prior
conviction evidence, and so be more willing than in a civil case to
allow the evidence in.
(4) The next notch: Assume as in hypothetical (3) that
Whitney is testifying for Dollar in a criminal case. But now assume
that the witness's alleged misconduct was more serious, amounting
to criminal recklessness, though she is not a party in this action.
Arguably, that fact severely undercuts the probative value of the
prior conviction, because in evaluating the key credibility ques-
tion-"Would Dollar have testified this way even if it weren't
true?"-the jury will already assume that she has committed one
act of criminal misconduct.
(5) Next, assume that the facts are as in hypothetical (4) ex-
cept that Whitney is Dollar's wife. The probative value of the char-
acter impeachment evidence diminishes even further, because the
119. It is plausible to hypothesize that civil defendants, especially those who have
acted wrongfully, tend to lie more readily to get out of difficulty improperly than plain-
tiffs do to make improper gains, and that juries intuitively believe this to be so. This
Article offers no proof of these hypotheses, which if true would probably suggest a
greater need for character impeachment of civil plaintiffs than of civil defendants.
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jury will likely assume, even without such evidence, that Whitney
would be inclined to lie to protect Dollar.
120
Note that we are now just one small step removed from the
ordinary case of the criminal defendant on the stand. Hypotheticals
(2), (3), (4), and (5) create a progression, providing a link between
the original Dollar case-a civil case in which the arguments for
admissibility of character impeachment evidence appear strong-
and the classic criminal case, as to which Part III has argued that a
per se rule of exclusion ought to apply. Naturally, not all cases will
fit so neatly along this continuum. There may be different combina-
tions of the listed factors (hypothetical (1), for example, is a civil
case in which the witness is a party), and other factors besides the
ones discussed in this progression-such as the nature of the char-
acter impeachment evidence, its resemblance to any alleged activity
of the witness in the current case, and the possibility of its overvalu-
ation-may enter into the calculation.
12'
CONCLUSION
Sometimes character impeachment evidence is beneficial over-
all and sometimes it is not, depending on the particular circum-
stances of the case, only one of which is the nature of the witness's
prior misconduct. When the witness is a criminal defendant, those
other circumstances justify a per se exclusionary rule, but in other
contexts, no categorical rule seems appropriate; at least none is eas-
120. Indeed, although Premise 2 posits that most people would be willing to lie to
save themselves from criminal punishment, it may be that even more would lie to save a
loved one.
121. In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), a products liability
plaintiff, whose arm was torn off when he reached inside a dryer, testified that he had
been instructed inadequately concerning the machine's operation and dangerous charac-
ter. The Court held that impeachment by evidence of his prior felony convictions for
burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary was allowable under the pre-1990 form of
rule 609, without considering prejudice to him. Under the approach presented here,
admissibility would be supported by the facts that the case was civil and that jurors
would be unlikely to draw any inference about Green's behavior from his prior record,
and perhaps by a conclusion that theft crimes have some bearing on truthtelling inclina-
tion. See People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 595-96, 420 N.W.2d 499, 517 (1988). Exclu-
sion would be supported by the fact that Green was a party-albeit a plaintiff, which
might be significant. In United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.
1983), disapproved, Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) The government was
allowed to impeach three defense witnesses with prior convictions. All three were pas-
sive witnesses in the current case, and their own conduct was not at issue. Under the
approach presented by this Article, most of the factors in Lipscomb point to admissibil-
ity, except that the party disadvantaged and potentially prejudiced was a criminal de-
fendant, and the interest of the witnesses, who were his friends, may have been,
sufficiently clear to minimize the need for character impeachment.
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ily articulable. Certainly a rule that works primarily by catego-
rizing the nature of the prior misconduct puts the emphasis in the
wrong place.
Under current law, rules such as rule 608 do give trial judges
discretion to admit or exclude cross-examination of the witness
concerning prior conduct suggesting untruthfulness, whether the
witness is a criminal defendant or anyone else. That discretion,
however, does not extend to prior criminal convictions, which are
treated separately by categorical rules such as rule 609. Rule 608
and similar rules should be narrowed in one respect, excluding
character impeachment of criminal defendants who testify, and
broadened in another respect, extending the trial judge's discretion,
in the case of other witnesses, to cover prior criminal convictions as
well as "[s]pecific instances of conduct" not resulting in convic-
tion. 122 Furthermore, rule 609 and similar categorical rules regard-
ing prior convictions should be abrogated: To the extent that such
rules apply to criminal defendants, they are inappropriate because
all character impeachment evidence of criminal defendants who
take the witness stand should be excluded; to the extent that such
rules apply to other witnesses, they would be rendered moot by the
broader scope of the discretionary rules. 123
122. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The 1990 amendments to rule 609 removed the widely-
disregarded limitation that evidence of a prior conviction could only be admitted "if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination."
See Committee Note, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353 (1990). The proposal here would not rein-
state this limitation.
123. This proposal clearly creates an asymmetry in that prosecution witnesses may
be subject to character impeachment evidence whereas the criminal defendant may not.
Concerns that such an asymmetry "would skew the decisional process" led the court in
People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 420 N.W.2d 550 (1988) to apply virtually the same
rules to accused-witnesses and other witnesses.
The proposal made here results in asymmetry because the situation is asymmetri-
cal; the burden of this Article has been to show that the impact of character impeach-
ment is far different depending on whether or not the witness is a criminal defendant.
Indeed, the Allen court recognized that "perfect symmetry cannot be attained" because
the criminal defendant is in a different position from that of other witnesses. 429 Mich.
at 607, 420 N.W.2d at 522. But even if the asymmetry of treating a criminal defendant
differently from other witnesses raises concern, that concern applies only in criminal
cases, and then only if the defendant and one or more prosecution witnesses are subject
to character impeachment evidence. Even within that situation, symmetry is a dubious
concern: criminal trials are filled with asymmetrical rules that favor the accused, includ-
ing the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
choice of whether to place in issue character traits bearing on his likeliness to commit
the crime.
Moreover, if the asymmetry, where it exists, were deemed to be a significant prob-
lem, the problem could be addressed by means short of automatically exposing the ac-
cused to character impeachment if he takes the stand. For instance, the rule could be
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To crystallize this proposal, this Article closes by presenting it
in the form of suggested amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Material in brackets is to be deleted; italicized material is to
be added.
1. Amend rule 404(a) as follows:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's char-
acter or a trait of character is not, admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except: * * *
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a wit-
ness, as provided in rules 607[,] and 608[, and 609].
2. Amend rule 608 as follows:
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credi-
bility of a witness other than an accused may be attacked or sup-
ported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful charac-
ter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthful-
ness has been attacked by, opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise. 
124
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the con-
duct of a witness, for the purpose of [attacking or supporting the
witness' credibility] proving that the witness has a good or poor char-
acterfor truthfulness,125 other than conviction of crime as provided
that if the accused uses character impeachment evidence against prosecution witnesses
(or perhaps only those prosecution witnesses involved in a head-to-head credibility bat-
tle with the accused), he opens the door to character impeachment by the prosecution.
Alternatively, the rule could be that in such a case the accused is put to a choice of
either opening the door to character impeachment by the prosecution or allowing an
instruction that, having heard character impeachment of the prosecution witness, the
jury should not speculate whether or not the accused committed any prior acts that bear
on his character for truthfulness.
124. This rule, of course, states only circumstances in which the character of a per-
son as witness may be examined; neither in its current form nor with the proposed
amendment does it have anything to say about any other purpose for which the charac-
ter of a person may become a subject of inquiry. In particular, the purpose behind this
amendment is not to alter Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), which allows a criminal
defendant to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of his character and the prosecution to
rebut such evidence.
125. This change is related only indirectly to the issues on which this Article fo-
cuses. The italicized form of words, rather than the current form referring to the wit-
ness's "credibility," is a more accurate statement of the law. In fact, extrinsic evidence
of the witness's prior conduct may be offered for purposes of attacking credibility (and,
once that door has been opened, for the purpose of supporting credibility) if the evi-
dence is on a non-collateral matter. Bias, for example, may be shown by extrinsic evi-
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in [rule 609] the last sentence of this paragraph, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if sufficiently probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness to
withstand objection under rule 403,126 be inquired into on cross-ex-
amination of the witness (1) concerning the [witness'] character of
the witness, if other than an accused, for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified. Evidence that a witness other than an
accused has been convicted of a crime may similarly be admitted in
the discretion of the court, if sufficiently probative of truthfulness to
withstand objection under rule 403. 127
The giving of testimony[, whether by an accused or] by any
[other] witness[,] does not operate as a waiver of the [accused's or
the] witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined
with respect to matters which relate only to credibility by showing
that the witness has a good or poor character for truthfulness.128
dence, as may a prior inconsistent statement on a non-collateral matter, all for the
purpose of showing that the witness's testimony is not credible. See, e.g., C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 118, at 77, 89. It is only when the purpose of the impeaching party is
the more collateral one of showing the witness's general character regarding truthful-
ness that the bar against extrinsic evidence applies. See id. at 110-12.
126. This form of words is intended to make very clear that bare probativeness is not
enough; the trial judge must weigh the evidence against the danger of prejudice and the
other factors listed in rule 403.
127. This sentence takes much of its language from rule 609, as amended in 1990.
Like amended rule 609, this proposal does not prescribe how the conviction may be
proved. As the Advisory Committee noted in commenting on the 1990 amendment, a
written record is often the most satisfactory method of proof, but testimony may be
satisfactory. 129 F.R.D. 347, 353 (1990).
128. The proposed amendment makes two changes to this paragraph. First, it
deletes references to an accused. Second, it limits the scope of the paragraph to matters
that not only relate to credibility but do so by bearing on the witness's character for
truthfulness. The following explanation is offered with the caveat that if it is not per-
suasive I will not be terribly disturbed, because this clause of the rule is obviously pe-
ripheral to the concerns of this Article.
The first change is made to avoid confusion. Under the proposal, a criminal ac-
cused should not be subject to examination on matters relating only to credibility by
exploring his character for truthfulness; references to the consequences of such an ex-
amination might be misleading. The sentence could be rephrased to apply to witnesses
other than a criminal accused, but that might carry an unintended connotation that an
accused is intended to be less favored than other witnesses.
The second change supplements, rather than replaces, the "credibility" language of
the current rule by "character for truthfulness" language because both have a role. An
accused charged with a crime involving dishonesty may choose to place his character
for truthfulness in issue, not to show his credibility as a witness, but to take advantage
of the option offered by rule 404(a)(1) of showing a "pertinent trait of character." If he
chooses to do so, he presumably should be held to have waived his privilege concerning
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3. Delete rule 609.
matters that bear on that character trait; thus, the reference to credibility serves a pur-
pose. But, as with respect to the first paragraph of the proposed new rule 608(b), that
reference does not suffice. See supra note 125. Giving testimony ought not be consid-
ered a waiver of the witness's privilege against incriminating himself with respect to
matters that are unrelated to the case except insofar as they tend to prove that he is not
credible because he has a poor character for truthfulness. But if the matter has a closer
bearing on his testimony-if, for example, it tends to show bias-it probably ought to be
considered fair matter for cross-examination.
1991]
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APPENDIX
Figure 1 presents a simple illustration of a Bayesian approach to ana-
lyzing an evidentiary problem. This is a map showing the roads connect-
ing five towns, 0, EXCULP, NOT-EXCULP, TEST(EXCULP), and
NOT-TEST(EXCULP). Traffic moves only from left to right. It will soon
be apparent why the lines to NOT-TEST(EXCULP) are broken.
Suppose that an observer, after watching the traffic leave 0 for some
time, assesses the probability that a given car at 0 will go to EXCULP to
be .3 on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 representing certainty. Because a car
leaving 0 and not going to EXCULP must be going to NOT-EXCULP, it
follows that the probability that the car will go to NOT-EXCULP is .7.
This first probability assessment may be expressed formally as
P (EXCULPI0) = .3,
or, "The probability of EXCULP given 0 is .3.," and the corollary as
P (NOT-EXCULP 10) = .7.
Now our observer moves to EXCULP and observes the cars traveling
to TEST(EXCULP) and NOT-TEST(EXCULP). Six of ten go to
TEST(EXCULP) and the rest to NOT-TEST(EXCULP). We can express
this second probability assessment by saying that
P (TEST(EXCULP) 10, EXCULP) = .6,
with the corollary that
P (NOT-TEST(EXCULP) 10, EXCULP) = .4.
Finally, the observer moves to NOT-EXCULP and observes the cars
traveling from there to TEST(EXCULP) and NOT-TEST(EXCULP).
Only two of ten go to TEST(EXCULP) and the rest to NOT-
TEST(EXCULP). This third probability assessment is expressed as
P (TEST(EXCULP) 10, NOT-EXCULP) = .2,
with the corollary that
P (NOT-TEST(EXCULP) 10, EXCULP) = .8.
Now we can ask a question that, in structure, resembles one that often
confronts adjudicative factfinders and judges determining the admissibility
of evidence. Suppose we know that a car has left 0 and that we then learn
that it has arrived at TEST(EXCULP). How great, if at all, is the proba-
tive value of this new piece of information? That is, what is the probability
of EXCULP given TEST(EXCULP) and 0, and to what extent does it
differ from the "prior" probability of EXCULP, assessed without learning
of TEST(EXCULP)? Or, using symbols, how great is
P(EXCULP ITEST(EXCULP)), 0), and how much does it differ from
P (EXCULP 10)?
There is a simple way, nothing more than an application of Bayes'
Theorem, to answer that question. Note that there are two routes to
TEST(EXCULP), through EXCULP and through NOT-EXCULP. Now
it is evident why the lines to NOT-TEST(EXCULP) are broken; once we
have learned that the car in question has gone to TEST(EXCULP), we can
focus solely on cars that go there, and disregard those that go to NOT-
TEST(EXCULP).
Of every 100 cars leaving 0, an average of 30 will go to EXCULP. Of
those 30, an average of 60%, or 18 in all, will go on to TEST(EXCULP).
Similarly, of every 100 cars leaving 0, an average of 70 will go to NOT-
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EXCULP. Of those 70, an average of 20%, or 14 in all, will go on to
TEST(EXCULP). Thus, of 32 cars leaving 0 and eventually arriving at
TEST(EXCULP), 18 will have gone via the EXCULP route and the re-
maining 14 via the NOT-EXCULP route. It follows that the probability
of EXCULP given TEST(EXCULP) and 0 is 18/32, or .5625. This
probability differs very substantially from the probability of EXCULP as-
sessed without learning of TEST(EXCULP), which was assessed at the
outset as .3. In other words, the evidence of TEST(EXCULP) has signifi-
cant probative value in determining the probability of EXCULP.
Of course, if we changed any of the three basic probability assess-
ments, the calculated probability of EXCULP given TEST(EXCULP) and
0 would change as well. It can be readily seen that, all other things being
equal:
the higher P (EXCULP 10) is, the higher
P (EXCULP I TEST(EXCULP), 0) will be;
the higher P (TEST(EXCULP) 10, EXCULP) is, the higher
P (EXCULP I TEST(EXCULP), 0) will be; and
the higher P (TEST(EXCULP) 10, NOT-EXCULP) is, the lower
P (EXCULP I TEST(EXCULP), 0) will be.
Now we can transform this roadmap illustration into a real litigation
problem. Suppose that EXCULP represents a disputed proposition-an
account exculpating the accused in a criminal prosecution-and NOT-EX.
CULP represents its negation. 0 represents all the evidence that the jury
knows apart from the testimony of the accused. TEST(EXCULP) repre-
sents the new evidence that the jury receives-knowledge that the accused
has given exculpatory evidence, testifying to EXCULP and has done so
with a given demeanor. We can leave NOT-TEST(EXCULP) in the
shadows because we know that the witnesss has in fact testified to EX-
CULP. The jury's problem now becomes, as in the roadmap case, to de-
termine the probability of proposition EXCULP given the new
information as well as the old, TEST(EXCULP) and 0. And, as in the
roadmap case, this probability will depend on each of the three basic as-
sessments: (1) the prior probability of EXCULP, assessed in the absence
of the accused's testimony; (2) the probability that the accused would tes-
tify to EXCULP if EXCULP were true; and (3) the probability that the
accused would testify to EXCULP if NOT-EXCULP were true.
Figure 2 is an altered diagram representing aspects of the argument
offered in Part III(A) of this Article. As in Figure 1, this diagram is
drawn on the assumption that the defendant has testified to an exculpatory
story. Figure 2 is drawn from the viewpoint of a rational juror unaware of
the character impeachment rule. (Recall that an advocate of allowing
character impeachment of criminal defendants had best make this assump-
tion of ignorance. 129). The diagram helps analyze the probative value of
the defendant's exculpatory testimony, first on the assumption that the
character impeachment evidence is not admitted and then on the assump-
tion that it is.
129. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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Three differences between Figures 1 and 2 warrant explanation. First,
instead of showing broken lines to nodes that are known not to be true,
such as NOT-TEST(EXCULP), those nodes, and the linkages to them, are
simply not represented at all in Figure 2.
Second, Figure 2 breaks down the routes from EXCULP and NOT-
EXCULP to TEST(EXCULP) into two parts each. It does this by placing
across those routes a new node, WILLTEST(EXCULP), representing the
proposition that the defendant is willing to testify to the exculpatory story
if doing so appears beneficial to his defense. This node is drawn in two
sections, one that can be reached only if EXCULP is true, and the other
that can be reached only if NOT-EXCULP is true. Thus, the top half of
the node may be considered to represent the conjunction EXCULP &
WILLTEST(EXCULP) and the bottom half the conjunction NOT-EX-
CULP & WILLTEST(EXCULP). 130 The node is sectioned in this way
because the probability of TEST(EXCULP) given EXCULP and
WILLTEST(EXCULP) is assumed to be different from the probability of
TEST(EXCULP) given NOT-EXCULP and WILLTEST(EXCULP);
thus, arrows to TEST(EXCULP) lead from each of the two sections of the
WILLTEST(EXCULP) node, representing different probabilities. 131 No
NOT-WILLTEST(EXCULP) node is shown because the fact that the de-
fendant testified to the exculpatory story demonstrates that he was willing
to do so.
Third, the thickness of the arrows represents, in very rough terms,
assumptions as to the probability of each link. The arrows leading from 0
to EXCULP and NOT-EXCULP are the same thickness, indicating that
the prior probabilities of these propositions are assumed hypothetically to
be equal. This assumption of course varies from case to case; in some cases
the prior probability of EXCULP may be very high and in others very low.
The other assumptions will also vary from one case to another, but because
they are based in part on psychological generalizations they will tend to
fall into a discernable pattern. The arrow from EXCULP to
WILLTEST(EXCULP) is drawn very heavily, indicating a probability
close to certainty that if the defendant is innocent he will be willing to
testify to his innocence if he thinks that will help. The arrow from the
EXCULP section of the WILLTEST(EXCULP) node to
TEST(EXCULP) is also heavy, though not as heavy. In the view of our
rational juror, unaware of the inhibiting effect of potential character im-
peachment evidence, most innocent defendants who are willing to testify to
an exculpatory story (that is, most innocent defendants) will actually do
so; on the other hand, fear of being a bad witness, or belief that the prose-
130. The node comprising the two sections represents the disjunction of the two
conjunctions-that is (EXCULP and WILLTEST(EXCULP)) or (NOT-EXCULP and
WILLTEST (EXCULP)). This disjunction is equivalent to (EXCULP or NOT-EX-
CULP) and WILLTEST(EXCULP). And, because (EXCULP or NOT-EXCULP) is a
tautology, this is equivalent to WILLTEST(EXCULP). Thus, the entire node repre-
sents WILLTEST(EXCULP).
131. Multiple-section nodes are further discussed in Friedman, supra note 57, at
612-15.
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cution has failed to prevent persuasive evidence, might keep an innocent
defendant off the stand.
The arrow from NOT-EXCULP to WILLTEST(EXCULP) is drawn
as heavily as that from EXCULP to WILLTEST(EXCULP), indicating
that a guilty defendant will be strongly inclined to tell an exculpatory story
if he thinks it will help his defense. The arrow from the NOT-EXCULP
section of the WILLTEST(EXCULP) node to TEST(EXCULP) is not
heavy, however: If the defendant were guilty and willing to lie in his own
defense, he might still have found it inadvisable to do so, for fear that a
failed attempt would leave him worse off than before; moreover, even if he
did testify, he might not have been able to do so as in fact he did, telling
the particular exculpatory story, and testifying with the demeanor that he
did.
Figure 2 thus suggests that the probative value of the accused's excul-
patory testimony does not arise from a perception that he is more likely to
be willing to testify to an exculpatory account if he is innocent than if he is
guilty; rather, the innocent defendant is more likely able than the guilty
one to bring off the testimony successfully.
Now, how does the situation change if character impeachment evi-
dence, such as proof of a prior conviction, is offered against the accused?
As argued in Part IV(A)(1), the evidence should not properly alter the first
probability asssessment, of the relative probabilities of EXCULP and
NOT-EXCULP as assessed without considering the accused's testimony,
because the evidence is offered only for credibility purposes. If, as is likely,
the evidence does in fact alter that asssessment, this effect must be consid-
ered prejudicial.
As argued in Part III(A)(2), the second probability assessment, of the
probability of TEST(EXCULP) given EXCULP probably will not be sig-
nificantly altered by the character impeachment evidence. An innocent
defendant with a prior criminal record is presumably no less willing than
one without to tell a truthful exculpatory story. And (again recalling the
assumption of the juror's ignorance), such an innocent defendant is proba-
bly not significantly less likely to bring off the testimony successfully than
is the one with the blameless past.
The key probability question is the third, the probability of
TEXT(EXCULP) given NOT-EXCULP. Part III(A)(3)(a) analyzes the
link between NOT-EXCULP and WILLTEST(EXCULP). It concludes
that a defendant who has committed the crime being tried is not sub-
stantially more likely to be willing to lie in his own defense if he
has also committed other misdeeds in the past. Finally, Part III(A)(3)(b)
analyzes the link between the NOT-EXCULP section of the
WILLTEST(EXCULP) node and TEST(EXCULP). It concludes that the
fact that the accused has a bad character for truthfulness usually has little
or no bearing on the question of whether, assuming he is guilty of the
crime charged and inclined to lie in his defense, he would tell the exculpa-
tory story and display the demeanor, that he has.
In sum, the character impeachment evidence offers the juror very lit-
tle assistance in evaluating the accused's credibility, but poses serious po-
tential prejudice.
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